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Classification of Participants in
Suicide Attacks and the
Implications of this Classification
on the Severity of the Sentence:
The Israeli Experience in the
Military Courts in Judea and
Samaria as a Model to Other
Nations
Amit Preiss* and Chagai D. Vinizky**
Introduction
The twenty-first century witnessed a considerable rise in
the number of suicide attacks. The largest suicide attacks were
carried out by Al-Qaeda in the United States on September 11,
2001, when that organization crashed four passenger planes
(including two into the Twin Towers and one into the Pentagon
building), killing 2,973 civilians. Between September 11, 2001
[Editor’s Note: Due to the inaccessibility of English translations for the
Hebrew sources cited in this article, the editors of PACE LAW REVIEW have not
reviewed the accuracy of all citations. The editors have, however, verified
many of the authors‘ general propositions concerning the Israeli case law
cited in the article.]
* Senior judge in the Military Court for Administrative Matters and
acted in the past as the Deputy President of the Military Court in Samaria,
holding the rank of lieutenant colonel.
** Dr., lecturer at Sha'arei Mishpat College of Law, Israel, Judge (res.)
in the Military Court in Samaria, holding the rank of captain. We are
grateful to Prof. Talia Einhoren, Dr. Leah Vizel, Dr. Hili Moodrick-Even
Chen, Dr. Gabriel Hallevy, Col. Nethanel Benishu, the Deputy President of
the Military Court of Appeal, Major Eyal Nun, Judge (res.) in the Military
Court in Samaria and research assistant Erez A. Korn for their useful
comments. The Hebrew version of this article will be published in CRIME AND
SOCIAL DEVIANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Moshe Addad & Yuval Wolf eds., in
print). All the mentioned case law of the Israeli courts and of the military
courts in Judea and Samaria are in Hebrew.
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(hereinafter 9/11) and the time of this Article, suicide attacks
have taken place in various countries throughout the world,
including Turkey, Great Britain, Egypt, India, Jordan, Spain,
and Iraq, leading to thousands of deaths. A large proportion of
the suicide attacks have been carried out in Israel. This
phenomenon was first seen in Israel in 1993 and continues to
the present. During the course of 125 suicide attacks, 718
people were murdered. As a suicide terrorist is willing to take
his life in order to put into effect his plan, and therefore does
not need an escape route, he is able to cause the death of
numerous innocent civilians.
The State of Israel, as a democratic state, has accumulated
considerable experience dealing with this phenomenon through
the use of legal devices. Usually this criminal phenomenon
cannot occur in the absence of terrorist infrastructures, which
include a number of functionaries such as the dispatcher, the
transporter, the intermediary, and the suicide terrorist. The
infrastructure that produces the suicide attacks in Israel
generally originates in the region of Judea and Samaria. By
virtue of its power to issue the orders needed to maintain
proper government and preserve public order and safety in this
region, the Military Government in Judea and Samaria
promulgated orders in regard to the criminal law, under which,
inter alia, Military Courts were established to try persons
charged with these offences.1
As a large proportion of the suicide attacks are directed
against Israeli citizens, and as many of those involved in these
attacks are tried in the Military Courts in Judea and Samaria,
the majority of the judgments given in respect of the
participants in suicide attacks are the product of this system.
Much of this case law has not been published and is not readily
available to the community of lawyers and researchers. It is
not surprising that the ratio of studies to case law is extremely
low. As this is the legal system with the greatest experience in
trying terrorists involved in suicide attacks, the ensuing case
law holds great importance for countries which are victims of
suicide attacks and have to conduct trials of those involved in
them. In this Article, we shall focus on the factual and legal
1. Netanel Benishu, Criminal Law in the Administered Territories:
Trends and Insights, 18 IDF L. REV. 293, 294-97 (2005) (Isr.). The author
also reviews the orders issued by the IDF on this matter. See id.
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classifications of the participants in suicide attacks and
examine the implications of these classifications on the severity
of the ensuing sentences.
I.

A Brief Overview of the Legal Regimes in
Israel and the United States

A pastoral atmosphere of tranquility at the heart of a
vibrant city is transformed in an instant to a scene of loss,
pain, and tears as a criminal takes his own life in order to
achieve his goal of murdering innocent civilians.
The
phenomenon of suicide attacks, which in recent years has
affected numerous countries, has caused the death of many
Israeli citizens. In certain periods, this was a daily horror, and
even now, after a significant decrease in the number of attacks,
this is a phenomenon which can explode afresh at any given
moment.2
As Israel is a state governed by the rule of law, which
combats its internal enemies by following the path of the law, it
confronts this phenomenon by using legal tools—regardless of
whether it is dealing with suicide attacks that have already
occurred or with planned suicide attacks that have been
frustrated in time, sometimes even at the eleventh hour, by
virtue of the resourcefulness of the security forces. Naturally,
in the former case, the confrontation is with persons who do not
bear direct criminal liability for the attack, as the direct
perpetrator of the attack is no longer alive (except in those rare
cases where the terrorist succeeds in killing others without
concomitantly losing his life).
In the latter case, the
confrontation is with the intended perpetrator of the attack as
well as with those bearing indirect criminal liability.
The majority of those responsible for committing suicide
attacks in Israel are tried by the Military Courts of Judea and

2. For an analysis of the various forms of terrorism, including specific
reference to Islamic terror and one of its aspects, Palestinian terrorism,
which includes suicide attacks, see Yuval Wolf & Ofir Frankel, Terrorism:
Toward an Overarched Account and Prevention with a Special Reference to
Pendulum Interplay Between Both Parties, 12 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV.
259 (2007). For a discussion regarding the phenomenon of suicide attacks,
see also ANAT BERKO, THE PATH TO PARADISE: THE INNER WORLD OF SUICIDE
BOMBERS AND THEIR DISPATCHERS (2007).
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Samaria,3 as almost all those charged with responsibility for
the commission of suicide attacks are Arab residents of this
region (as distinct from Israeli citizens), and therefore are
subject to the jurisdiction of this legal system. The Military
Court system consists of two courts of first instance, one for the
region of Judea and the second for the region of Samaria, and
an appeals court.4 In contrast to the system of military
tribunals that are responsible for trying Israel Defense Force
(IDF) soldiers, where the bench includes both judges possessing
a legal education and a judge lacking a legal education, in the
Military Courts system in Judea and Samaria, the trial is
conducted solely by judges possessing legal educations.5 The
prosecution is conducted by the Military Prosecutor. In light of
the gravity of the offences, those charged with responsibility for
carrying out suicide attacks are represented by Israeli defense
counsel or a resident of Judea and Samaria. The trials are
conducted in accordance with the Israeli laws of evidence, and
many of the Israeli rules of criminal procedure also apply. The
substantive law consists of local statutes and orders issued by
the Military Commander, in his capacity as the sovereign
power in the occupied territory under the laws of war; however,
with regards to the elements of the offences committed in the
course of the suicide attacks, there are no major differences
between this law and Israeli law.6 The relevant legislation in
relation to the classification of those responsible for committing
the offence is the Order Relating to Rules of Liability for an
3. A minority of those responsible for suicide attacks have been tried in
the State of Israel by virtue of parallel jurisdiction in certain situations. See
Penal Law, 5737-1977, S.H. 864, 226 §§ 7, 13-14 [hereinafter Israeli Penal
Law]. In this connection, see also CrimC (TA) 1158/02 Israel v. Barghouti,
[2003] Takdin Mehozi 2003(1) 327.
4. Until the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip there was also a military
court responsible for that region. The court was closed upon the conclusion of
the process of withdrawal. It is noteworthy that the decisions of the Military
Court of Appeal are subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court sitting as
the High Court of Justice.
5. In the past, the military court bench was also composed of judges
lacking legal educations sitting alongside jurists. In 2002, this practice was
abolished, and all the judges in this legal system now possess a legal
education. For a further discussion on this process, see Benishu, supra note
1, at 305-06.
6. For a discussion regarding the legislative framework in which the
military courts operate, the legal procedures, and the laws of evidence, see
Benishu, supra note 1, at 294-304.
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Offence (Judea and Samaria) (No. 225), 5728-1968.7
The Military Court system in Judea and Samaria, which
operates in accordance with the ordinary laws of evidence and
rules of procedure, including legal representation for
defendants, can provide a model for other countries that face
the need to try a large number of persons accused of terrorist
activities. In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States was
required to deal with the trials of those involved in terrorism in
general, and those involved in suicide attacks in particular,
including participants of the 9/11 attacks. These alleged
terrorists are accused of planning, mediating, couriering, and
attempting to take part in terrorist attacks.
During the American campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq,
the United States captured foreign nationals allegedly involved
in terrorist activities.
Many of these individuals were
transferred to the Guantánamo base in Cuba.8 While being
held at Guantánamo, they were not given the rights usually
afforded to detainees in the United States—i.e., they were not
informed of the charges against them nor where they given
access to counsel.9 Some of these detainees, through ―next
friends,‖ challenged their detentions, alleging, inter alia, that
they were being held unlawfully.10 They sought various forms
of relief, including writs of habeas corpus.11 In Al Odah v.
United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ruled that foreign detainees in a
territory that was not under the sovereignty of the United
States—i.e., detainees held at the Guantánamo base—were not
entitled to exercise the right of habeas corpus.12 In so ruling,
the court relied, inter alia, on the Supreme Court‘s decision in

7. Statutory compilation (Judea and Samaria) (no. 12), 467 [hereinafter
Order Relating to Rules of Liability for an Offence].
8. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir.
2003), rev’d, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1140-44. See also Shaul Gordon & David Shoresh, The
Military Commissions in Guantanamo and the Military Courts in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip – A Comparative Analysis, 2 IDF L. REV. 277, 282
(2005).
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Johnson v. Eisentrager.13
In 2004, this decision was appealed to the Supreme
The Supreme Court accepted the appellant‘s
Court.14
argument and rejected the Government‘s position, drawing a
distinction between the case at hand and the circumstances
considered in Eisentrager.15 The Court held that while the
United States lacked legal sovereignty in the Guantánamo
area, in practice it was the sole governing body, and this gave
rise to the Court‘s jurisdiction.16 In addition, the Court did not
find any statutory authority denying courts‘ jurisdiction in
such cases.17 Accordingly, the federal courts had jurisdiction to
consider, within the framework of habeas corpus proceedings,
whether foreign citizens were being lawfully held in
Guantánamo Bay, and the government was powerless to
prevent them from accessing the courts.18 At the same time,
the Supreme Court refrained from ruling that foreign citizens
detained in American detention centers around the world were
always entitled to the right to habeas corpus. The Court also
declined to reverse the Eisentrager ruling, choosing instead to
distinguish it from the case before it.19
Following Rasul, and in the absence of relevant legislation,
the United States Government decided to establish a system of
military commissions in accordance with the principles of the
13. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1138-45 (discussing and citing Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), intermittently).
14. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
15. Id. at 476-79.
16. Id. at 480-83. See also Gordon & Shoresh, supra note 12, at 283.
17. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483-85.
18. See generally id. at 470-85. In this connection too, it is worth
considering the approach taken by the legal system in Israel in an analogous
situation. Following the Six Day War in which Israel seized the regions of
Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, the then-Attorney General Meir
Shamgar (later President of the Supreme Court) decided not to argue that
the residents of these areas lacked locus standi, and as a consequence of this
decision, the Supreme Court of Israel granted locus standi to these detainees
in the High Court of Justice. See Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and
Problems of the Israeli Military Government – The Initial Stage, in 1
MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL, 19671980: THE LEGAL ASPECT, at 13, 56 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982); Moshe Landau,
Fifty Years of Law in Israel: I do not Believe in Judicial Activism, 16 JUST. 3,
4 (1998); LISA HAJJAR, COURTING CONFLICT: THE ISRAELI MILITARY COURT
SYSTEM IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA 57 (2005).
19. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-79, 480-83. See also id. at 487-89 (Kennedy,
J., concurring); Gordon & Shoresh, supra note 12, at 284.
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laws of war, which deviate from the customary legal process, to
deal judicially with detained enemy combatants. Under the
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), the federal courts were
declared, inter alia, to have no jurisdiction to hear petitions
brought by the detainees of Guantánamo.20
The Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of these
commissions in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.21 In Hamdan, the Court
held that these ―military commission[s] . . . lack[ed] [the] power
to proceed because [their] structure and procedures violate[d]
both the [Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)] and the
Geneva Conventions.‖22 First, the Court stated that the ―the
UCMJ, the [Authorization for Use of Military Force], and the
DTA at most acknowledge a general Presidential authority to
convene military commissions in circumstances where justified
under the ‗Constitution and laws,‘ including the law of war.‖23
Then, the Court analyzed whether the military commission at
issue met that standard.24 Particularly, Hamdan argued, inter
alia, that the commission was illegal because he could ―be
convicted based on evidence he [had] not seen or heard, and
[because] any evidence admitted against him need not comply
with the admissibility or relevance rules typically applicable in
criminal trials and court-martial proceedings.‖25 Ultimately,
the Court determined that court-martial rules had to apply in
this case because it would not ―be impracticable to apply
[them].‖26 The Court also held that the rules of the commission
contravened Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which
provides, inter alia, that in a conflict of this type every state
has to comply with a minimum array of accepted rules and
rights recognized as being immutable upon trying detainees—
including the basic right to be present during the trial, a right
which was absent from the provisions of the Detainee
Treatment Act.27 Accordingly, the commissions had not been
20. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §
105(e)(3)(C)(ii), 119 Stat. 2680, 2743 (2005) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
21. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
22. Id. at 567.
23. Id. at 594-95.
24. Id. at 595.
25. Id. at 615-16.
26. Id. at 623-24.
27. Id. at 629-33, 635. See also Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S.
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constituted under a law enacted by Congress as necessary, or
in accordance with the laws of war, and, therefore, they had to
be dismantled.28
Following this judgment, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act (MCA),29 providing these commissions with a
statutory basis, again negating the jurisdiction of the courts to
hear habeas corpus petitions submitted by detainees in the
Guantánamo base, and removing the right to contend that the
rights set out in the Geneva Conventions applied.30 While the
MCA enables appeals to be submitted to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, this
procedure can only be pursued in extremely limited
circumstances.31 Likewise, the MCA created a trial mechanism
that was different from the ordinary legal process.32 For
example, the MCA provided that:
In establishing procedures and rules of evidence
for military commission proceedings, the
Secretary of Defense may prescribe the following
provisions: . . . Evidence shall be admitted as
authentic so long as -- (i) the military judge of the
military commission determines that there is
sufficient basis to find that the evidence is what
it is claimed to be; and (ii) the military judge
instructs the members that they may consider
any issue as to authentication or identification of
evidence in determining the weight, if any, to be
No. 3364.
28. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 635. The Court so held even though it
assumed . . . that the allegations made in the Government‘s
charge against Hamdan are true . . . , that Hamdan is a
dangerous individual whose beliefs, if acted upon, would
cause great harm and even death to innocent civilians, and
who would act upon those beliefs if given the opportunity.
Id.
29.
2600.
30.
31.
32.
17.

Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
Id. § 5(a), 120 Stat. at 2631.
Id. ch. 47A, subch. VI, § 950f, 120 Stat. at 2622.
See, e.g., id. ch.47A, subch. IV (―Trial Procedure‖), 120 Stat. at 2607-
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given to the evidence.33
Following the passage of the MCA, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled on
Guantánamo detainees‘ ―petitions for writs of habeas corpus[,
which] allege[d] violations of the Constitution, treaties,
statutes, regulations, the common law, and the law of
nations.‖34 The detainees argued, inter alia, that ―the MCA, in
depriving the courts of jurisdiction over the detainees‘ habeas
petitions, violate[d] the Suspension Clause of the Constitution,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.‖35 The court, citing to Eisentrager,
ruled that terrorist detainees held in territory not subject to
the sovereignty of the United States had no right to petition for
habeas corpus and were not entitled to the protection of the
Suspension Clause.36 Accordingly, no flaw could be found in
the fact that the MCA precluded the federal courts from
exercising the power of habeas corpus because the detainees
were not accorded constitutional rights.
The matter reached the Supreme Court.37
The key
question was whether the detainees were entitled to
constitutional rights and to the application of the Suspension
Clause, enabling them to petition for habeas corpus.38 The
Court held that Guantánamo Bay detainees suspected of
terrorist activities could appeal to the civil courts regarding
their administrative detention.39 The decision, reached by a 54 majority, held that the detainees had a constitutional right to
petition the courts to examine the justification for their
continued detention.40
The Court held that the Eisentrager ruling was not
applicable to the Guantánamo detainees and that the right to
habeas corpus was necessary to prevent the arbitrariness of
government and to strengthen the principle of separation of
33. Id. subch. IV, § 949a(b)(2)(D), 120 Stat. at 2608.
34. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 128 S.
Ct. 2229 (2008).
35. Id. at 988.
36. Id. at 989-94.
37. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
38. Id. at 2240.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2277.
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powers.41 It ruled that the MCA infringed on the Constitution
and the principle of separation of powers and, therefore, had to
be invalidated.42 The Court declined ―to offer a comprehensive
summary of the requisites for an adequate substitute for
habeas corpus.‖43 It did, however, provide some guidance on
the issue and ultimately ―[held] that when the judicial power to
issue habeas corpus properly is invoked the judicial officer
must have adequate authority to make a determination in light
of the relevant law and facts and to formulate and issue
appropriate orders for relief, including, if necessary, an order
The Court, therefore,
directing the prisoners‘ release.‖44
provided the President and Congress with a model of sorts that
they could use to fashion new commissions that would not run
afoul of the Constitution.
In this context, it is possible to draw for assistance upon an
amicus curiae brief, which was submitted to the Court in
support of the petition by a number of Israeli experts.45 It
presented Israel‘s method of coping with local terrorism over a
considerable period of time. This brief stated that Israel was
committed to safeguarding human rights and accorded
numerous legal rights and maintained due process in
accordance with all the mandatory criteria necessitated by the
framework of the Military Courts operating within the region
of Judea and Samaria.46 This array of rights also applied in
extreme situations, such as during the period of the Defensive
Shield Campaign, and, as former President of the Israeli
Supreme Court Aharon Barak formulated it: ―Every Israeli
soldier carries, in his pack, the provisions of public
international law regarding the laws of war and the basic
provisions of Israeli administrative law. . . . There is no
security without law.‖47
41. Id. at 2257-59.
42. Id. at 2262-74.
43. Id. at 2266.
44. Id. at 2266-71.
45. Brief for Specialists in Israeli Military Law and Constitutional Law
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229
(2007) (Nos. 06-1195 & 06-1196), 2007 WL 2441592. The brief was written by
Prof. Ariel Bendor, Prof. Eyal Benvenisti, Prof. Emanuel Gross, Prof. Asher
Maoz, Prof. Barak Medina, Prof. Yuval Shani, and Prof. Amos Shapira.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 7 (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Chief Justice Barak).
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On January 22, 2009, his first day after taking office,
President Barack Obama signed an executive order directing
the closing of the detention camp at Guantánamo Bay within a
year.48 The order required a review to be carried out to
determine whether the detainees should be transferred to other
countries.49 With regard to those detainees who could not be
transferred to other countries, the review would examine the
possibility of pursuing criminal prosecutions against them
within the United States and identify the appropriate court for
the trial to take place.50 Likewise, a review would be conducted
as to whether it was possible to continue detaining persons in
the United States who could be neither released nor
prosecuted.51
President Obama ordered a freeze on all
proceedings in all trials being conducted in Guantánamo.52
The freeze was aimed at enabling the administration to
consider where it was possible to continue the prosecution of
detained terrorist suspects.
Adopting the system operating in the Military Courts in
the region of Judea and Samaria to try terrorists can, in our
opinion, resolve some of the problems raised by the case law,
legislation, and executive order discussed above. The Israeli
experience shows that no difficulty ensues from enabling
defendants to be represented.
On the contrary, it is
unwarranted for defendants accused of such grave offences to
be unrepresented. Likewise, there is no need whatsoever for
special evidentiary laws or rules of procedure. It is possible to
try a large number of defendants efficiently without any need
to deviate from the ordinary laws of evidence and procedural
rules which are designed, inter alia, to protect the right of the
accused to due process. We think that the Military Courts in
Judea and Samaria can serve as an appropriate model to other
countries that have to conduct trials against participants in
suicide attacks.
48. Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo
Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13,492,
74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). See also Charlie Savage, Delay Expected
on Illinois Plan for Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at A1 (reporting that
officials believe Guantanamo Bay will be closed by 2011 at the earliest).
49. Exec. Order No. 13,492 §§ 3-4, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4898-99.
50. Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 4(c)(3), 74 Fed. Reg. at 4899.
51. Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 4(c)(4), 74 Fed. Reg. at 4899.
52. Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 7, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4899.
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Likewise, it is possible to adopt the Israeli law relating to
the Detention of Unlawful Combatants. This law, 5762-2002,
is intended, according to Section 1, ―to regulate the detention of
unlawful combatants, who are not entitled to the status of
prisoner of war, in a manner which is consistent with the
commitments of the State of Israel under the legal provisions of
international humanitarian law.‖53 According to Section 9, ―[i]t
is possible to commence criminal proceedings against an
unlawful combatant in accordance with any law.‖54 With
regard to detainees who are too dangerous to release but who
also cannot be prosecuted, it is possible to adopt the laws of
administrative detention prevailing in Israel. These laws
incorporate rules of judicial review and the right of appeal to
the Military Court of Appeal, which too is subject to judicial
review by the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of
Justice. This course of action is not the preferred course, but is
merely the course of last resort in these cases.
Beyond a procedural comparison, it is also possible to draw
lessons from the Israeli experience with regards to substantive
law. In this Article, we shall examine the classifications of
various functionaries in a suicide attack (such as the
dispatcher, intermediary, transporter, and prospective suicide
terrorist) within legal categories applicable to participants in
the offence (principal perpetrator, accomplice, accessory, and
instigator) on the basis of extensive case law produced by the
Military Court system regarding the classification existing
under the Order Relating to the Rules of Liability for an Offence
(Judea and Samaria).55 In this Article we shall not draw any
53. Israeli Penal Law 5762-2002, 2002, S.H. § 1.
54. Id. § 9.
55. The Rules of Liability for an Offence (Judea and Samaria) (no. 225)
5728-1968 [hereinafter Rules of Liability (JS)] are similar to the rules of law
prevailing in Israel prior to Amendment No. 39 to the Penal Law. See Israeli
Penal Law (Amendment No. 39) 1994, S.H. 1481, 348 [hereinafter
Amendment No. 39]. Therefore, they are unlike the law now prevailing in
the State of Israel. For a discussion regarding the current law in Israel on
this matter, see, e.g., Miriam Gur Arye, Parties to an Offence – Amendment
39 to the Penal Law as Tested by the Case Law, in DIRECTIONS IN CRIMINAL
LIABILITY: INQUIRIES IN THE THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 83 (Eli Lederman ed.,
2001) (Isr.); Arnold Enker, On the Distinction Between a Principal Offender
and an Accessory, 17 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 339 (2002) (Isr.); Mordechai
Kremnitzer & Liat Levanon, On Abetment of Crime and Interpretation of
Criminal Law, 17 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 403 (2002) (Isr.); CrimA (XX) 2796/95
Anon. v. Israel, 51 [1997] P.D. 388(3); CrFH (XX) 1294/96 Meshulam v.
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additional comparisons with the various legal classifications
made in other legal systems that bring to trial those involved
in suicide attacks. Attempting a comparison with the legal
categories prevailing in any legal systems that may deal with
the need to try participants in suicide attacks, such as those of
Israel, England, Spain or the United States, would have
created a great deal of obscurity and prevented this Article
from achieving its goals. Such comparisons are worthy subjects
of future articles. Within the framework of this Article, we
shall present the extensive case law which has accumulated in
relation to the classification of participants in suicide attacks
in the Military Court system operating in the region of Judea
and Samaria.
We shall also examine the impact this
classification has had on the severity of the penalty, so that
those responsible for the judiciary in each legal system can
learn from this case law about the appropriate standard of
severity of the sentences which should be imposed on each
functionary per se and relative to the others, in the chain
which ultimately brought about the suicide attacks.
II. Definition of the Term ―Suicide Attack‖
What does the term ―suicide attack‖ mean? Does it refer to
every attack in which the actual or potential direct perpetrator
plans to lose his life during the process of executing it? Or,
does it perhaps refer only to attacks in which the means of
attack is a bomb carried on the body of the suicide attacker or
placed in proximity to him? This question does not have legal
significance when inquiring into the guilt of an alleged
terrorist. In all of the cases where murder is committed,
including cases of suicide attacks, the relevant offence is
deliberately causing death contrary to Section 51 of the Order
Relating to Defense Regulations (Judea and Samaria) (No. 378)
5730– 1970 (or an attempt to commit such an offence, in the
event that the offence failed).56 Accordingly, at this stage there
Israel, 52 [1998] P.D. 1(5); SCrF (TA) 1158/02 Israel v. Barghouti, [2004]
Takdin Mehozi 3430(2). For a comparison between the law prevailing prior
to Amendment No. 39 and the subsequent law in relation to the issue of those
liable for an offence, see IAAKOV KEDMI, ON CRIMINAL LAW: THE PENAL LAW,
315-408 (2005) (Isr.).
56. The offence of causing death deliberately is somewhat wider than the
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is no need to define the term ―suicide attack‖ because all lethal
attacks, suicide attacks included, are treated as murders.
The definition of the term ―suicide attack‖ is relevant only
when determining the penalty, and in particular, when the
court is considering the offence of an attempt to deliberately
cause death. This is because in the completed offences of
deliberately causing death, whether reference is to a suicide
attack or to a different act of murder, the customary penalty is
imprisonment for life,57 save in exceptional circumstances
where there are alleviating factors which focus not on the
manner of commission of the murder but on the degree of
involvement of the accused in the act of murder, or, special
circumstances which relate to the level of understanding and
judgment of the accused (particularly the fact that the accused
is a minor). In contrast, when the offence is one of attempt to
deliberately cause death, the definition of the term ―suicide
attack‖ is particularly important. For this offence, a sentence
of life imprisonment is the exception and not the rule, as the
actions have not led to the death of a person. Nonetheless, as
we shall see below, this exception comes into play principally
(albeit not in every case) where there is an attempt to cause
death deliberately by means of a suicide attack.58 Accordingly,
the question of the definition of the term ―suicide attack‖ is
highly relevant when the offence is one of an attempt to cause
death deliberately by means of a suicide attack.
One type of case that involves the query as to which
corresponding provision in Israeli law—namely, the offence of premeditated
murder under Israeli Penal Law 5737-1977, S.H. § 300(a)(2). For further
discussion of this, see (JS) 79/99 Shamasna v. Military Prosecutor, [2005]
Judgments of Adm. Terr. 14(1) 1.
57. The maximum penalty for the offence of causing death deliberately is
death. At the same time, the military courts in Judea and Samaria have
never imposed the death penalty in a final judgment, and for many years, the
military prosecutor has also not petitioned for this penalty. Accordingly, in
practice, the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. For a discussion on the
issue of the death penalty, see Ofer Ben Haim, The Death Penalty in the Case
Law of the Military Courts in Israel and the Administered Territories, 10 IDF
L. REV. 35 (1989) (Isr.).
58. This exception of life imprisonment for acts which have not led to the
death of a person was also recognized in certain circumstances where the
accused participated in a large number of attempts to cause death
deliberately. For a discussion on this, see Appeals (JS) 120+122+151+153/02
Nofel v. Military Prosecutor and Counter Appeal, [2003] Judgments of Adm.
Terr. 14(1) 260 (unpublished).
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situations are included within the term ―suicide attack‖ is
where planned massive gunfire is directed at a place teeming
with human beings—or where such planned shooting is
stopped in mid-fire—and the shooter is willing to lose his life
during the commission of this offence. Such an attack is often
called a ―no-escape attack.‖ In other words, there are those
who distinguish literally between this form of attack and the
more familiar form of attack in which the potential or actual
suicide terrorist carries an explosive device on his body and
acts as a ―living bomb.‖
In the Ha’nini judgment,59 the Military Court of Appeal for
the first time directly considered the question of the above
definition.60 This case involved the trial of a defendant who
had planned to commit a ―no-escape attack‖ together with
another person. The attack failed. When the defendant and
his friend were close to their destination, they were stopped by
IDF soldiers who opened fire on them. In reply, the defendant
and his friend directed rapid fire at the soldiers and ran away
from the site. The court held that the type of cases known as
―no-escape attacks‖ falls within the definition of ―suicide
attacks.‖ In making this finding, the Military Court of Appeal
preferred following an expansive approach to the definition of
the term ―suicide attacks.‖
The court emphasized the
willingness of the potential attacker to lose his life during the
course of the attack. In the opinion of the court, this
willingness negated the difference in the potential killing
between an attack by means of a ―living bomb‖ and a ―noescape attack.‖
In criticism of the adoption of the expansive approach, it is
possible to note a number of grounds that support taking the
narrow view that the ―no-escape‖ type of attack should not be
classified as a ―suicide attack.‖ These grounds were set out by
one of the judges in the court of first instance in Ha’nini.61 For
the purpose of fair disclosure, it should be noted that that judge

59. Appeals (JS) 1049/05+45/04 Military Prosecutor v. Ha'nini and
Counter Appeal, [2005] (unpublished).
60. The Military Court of Appeal discussed this matter obiter even
beforehand in Appeals (JS) 1468/04 Shalabi v. Military Prosecutor, [2005]
(unpublished).
61. Ct.
(JS)
6249/03 Military Prosecutor v. Ha'nini, [2004]
(unpublished).
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was one of the authors of this Article.62
According to the expansive approach, which has been
accepted as the prevailing legal ruling, a person who was on
the verge of committing a ―no-escape attack‖ will be sentenced
to life imprisonment. This was indeed the sentence imposed on
the defendant in Ha’nini. However, when the case concerns a
defendant who carried out a shooting attack with the intention
of murdering a large number of people using measures
appropriate for that purpose (from the point of view of the type
of weapon, shooting range, lack of protection of the targets,
etc.), but without the intention of losing his life in the process,
then, according to the rulings of the Military Court of Appeal,
that defendant will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
about ten years. This outcome is incoherent as a defendant
who has been stopped on his way to a ―no-escape attack‖
without having fired a single shot may be sent to prison for the
rest of his life. In contrast, a defendant who has carried out a
shooting attack, including cases where rapid fire is carried out
and miraculously does not lead to the death of others, will be
sentenced to a completely different quantitative and qualitative
penalty merely because he did not intend to take his own life.
This problematic outcome, which ensues from the
emphasis placed on the willingness of the attacker to take his
own life during the course of the attack without regards to the
potential death toll resulting from his acts, will lead to the
situation where even someone who is willing to commit suicide
62. Amit Preiss was one of the judges in the court of first instance in
Ha’nini. The second author of this article, Chagai Vinizki, actually supports
the position adopted by the Military Court of Appeal. There have been a
number of ―no-escape attacks‖ in which numerous people were killed. One
example is the attack at Virginia Tech on April 17, 2007, in which thirty-two
people were killed in a no-escape type killing spree begun by a student who
ultimately also killed himself. See Virginia Tech Shootings: Lives Lost,
WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2007, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/04/18/AR2007041802607.html. On the other hand, there have also been
many ―living bomb‖ suicide attacks resulting in multiple injuries but in which
no people were killed at all or which resulted in only a few fatal injuries.
Even though it may be assumed that on average there will be more victims in
―living bomb‖ type suicide attacks than in ―no-escape‖ type suicide attacks,
the important factor is still the murderer‘s willingness to kill a large number
of people accompanied by a willingness to take his own life. This willingness
enables the murderer (both the ―living bomb‖ type and the ―no-escape‖ type)
to harm a large number of people without need to ensure an escape route,
and therefore a uniform classification must be given to the two cases.
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during the course of a knife attack will be regarded as a suicide
attacker. This hypothetical knife attacker will, therefore, be
sentenced to life imprisonment. This ignores the fact that the
potential risk involved in a knife attack is immeasurably
smaller than the potential risk entailed by a shooting attack,
and the potential risk entailed by a shooting attack is smaller
than the potential risk entailed by an attack involving a ―living
bomb.‖ From the point of view of the court‘s judgments,
however, there is no difference between a knife attack, a
shooting attack, and an attack involving a ―living bomb,‖ so
long as the attacker intends to take his own life during the
course of the assault.
The difference between the three types of attacks does not
only apply in relation to the potential risk but also in relation
to the ability to prevent the attack. When the attack is one
which is to be conducted by means of a ―living bomb,‖ the
terrorist can easily reach the center of the crowd with the
explosive device strapped to his body or carried in a bag, and
with one push of the button, destroy all those surrounding him.
In contrast, when the attack is a ―no-escape attack,‖ the
shooter will find it difficult to conceal his weapon (apart from
cases when he is merely using a pistol) and therefore he will
find it difficult to reach the center of the crowd without being
disturbed. Moreover, in a ―no-escape attack‖ the shooter
cannot injure a large number of people in a single instant,
compared to a terrorist who acts as a ―living bomb,‖ who needs
only to press a button in order to execute a mass killing. The
shooter in a ―no-escape attack‖ is required to carry out a series
of acts which include drawing the weapon, aiming it, and firing
it intermittently, while during this period, which can last for a
number of minutes, it is possible to thwart the continued
commission of the attack and save the lives of potential
victims.
In view of these differences, it is desirable (contrary to the
Ha’nini ruling) to create a categorical distinction between the
two types of attacks. This way those involved in ―no-escape
attacks‖ which have not achieved their goals, will not be given
the maximum penalty of life imprisonment, but rather a
sentence of imprisonment for a term of years, the length of
which is consistent with the degree to which the attack
succeeded, the level of involvement of the defendant in the
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attack, and other punitive considerations.
So far we have considered the definition of the term
―suicide attack.‖ As noted, the case law has chosen to adopt the
expansive approach to this act, so that the definition will also
include the class of ―no-escape attacks.‖ We shall now describe
how the case law has dealt with the other aspects of suicide
attacks. For this purpose, we shall draw a distinction between
suicide attacks which succeed, that is, which lead to the deaths
of others—and therefore, the offence is one of causing death
deliberately—and suicide attacks which fail during one of the
stages of the attempt to commit them—and therefore, the
offence is one of attempting to cause death deliberately.
III. Suicide Attacks that Succeed
A. Background
When, unfortunately, the suicide attack has achieved its
goal—the murder of innocent people—the relevant offence is
causing death deliberately. In these cases, in light of the
gravity of the offence, the general rule is that a sentence of life
imprisonment will be imposed; only in exceptional cases will a
more lenient sentence of a term of years be imposed. The
decision whether to apply the rule or the exception in cases of a
suicide attack is based on the degree of involvement of the
accused in the successful suicide attack. The degree of
involvement of the accused is derived from the classification of
liability for his acts. In other words, it depends on whether he
is the principal perpetrator, an accomplice, an accessory, or an
instigator. Accordingly, as a starting point for determining the
penalty to be imposed on the various persons involved in a
suicide attack, it is necessary to consider the legal categories of
the participants in the offence, as established in the law
applied by the Military Courts in Judea and Samaria. This
classification is conducted in accordance with Section 14(a) of
the Order Relating to the Rules of Liability for an Offence
(Judea and Samaria) which provides that:
a. Where an offence is committed, each of the
following is deemed to have taken part in its
commission and to bear responsibility for it,
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and it is possible to charge him with
commission of the offence:
1. Any person who does the act or one of
the acts or makes the omission or one
of the omissions which constitute the
offence,
2.

Any person who does or omits to do
any act for the purpose of enabling or
aiding another person to commit the
offence,

3.

Any person who, whether or not he is
present at the time the offence is
committed, aids another person to
commit the offence, a person is
deemed to have aided another if he is
present at the place where the offence
is committed for the purpose of
overawing
opposition
or
of
strengthening the resolution of the
perpetrator or of ensuring the carrying
out of the offence which is due to be
committed,

4.

Any person who counsels or procures
any other person to commit the
offence, whether or not he is present
at the time the offence is committed.

The above Section 14 is similar in substance (albeit not
identical) to Section 26 of the Penal Law, 5737-1977, prior to
being amended by Amendment No. 39.
As the above
amendment was not adopted in the legislation applicable to the
region of Judea and Samaria, the law in these areas is similar
to the law prevailing in Israel prior to the above amendment
and is substantively different from the law applicable in Israel
today. When the Military Court of Appeal was required to
interpret Section 14, it held that the first alternative in
subsection (a) of Section 14 concerned the principal perpetrator
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of the offence, the second concerned an accomplice to an
offence, the third an accessory, and the fourth a counselor or
instigator.63
It should be emphasized that according to Section 14, any
person falling within one of the four categories mentioned will
be deemed guilty of committing the offence, and in principle,
may be subject to the maximum penalty set for the offence
committed.64 This is in contrast to the position in Israeli law
after Amendment No. 39, which distinguishes between
someone who is classified as the perpetrator or instigator, who
may be subject to the maximum penalty set for the offence
committed, and someone who is classified as an accessory to
the offence, who may be subject to only half the penalty set for
the offence (apart from certain exceptions).65
However, in a number of fundamental judgments66 that
will be reviewed in detail below, the Military Court of Appeal
recognized the possibility that classification of the various
participants in the commission of an offence would dictate the
imposition of different penalties, even though the maximum
penalty would be identical in relation to all the participants,
whatever their classification. This ruling was given in the case
of defendants who were convicted of involvement, as
accessories or accomplices, in offences of causing death
deliberately through suicide attacks. The ruling recognized the
possibility of a distinction between the penalty given to the
principal perpetrator and the penalty given to the accomplice
or accessory. However, concurrently, it did not negate the
possibility that there would be no distinction between the
penalty of the first and the penalty of the second or third
participants where the choice between the possibilities would
be consistent with the circumstances of the case under
consideration.
We shall now turn to an examination of the legal

63. See, e.g., Appeals (JS) 320+323/03 Military Prosecutor v. Ali and
Counter Appeal, [2004] (unpublished).
64. Order Relating to the Rules of Liability for an Offence (JS) (no. 225),
1968, S.H. § 14.
65. Israeli Penal Law, § 32.
66. See, e.g., Appeals (JS) 65/02 Moukadi v. Military Prosecutor, [2003]
Judgments of Adm.Terr. 14(1) 159; Appeals (JS) 101/03 A'amouri v. Military
Prosecutor, [2004] (unpublished).
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classifications, in so far as they are relevant to suicide attacks.
Initially, we shall consider, in relation to each classification,
which of the ―jobholders‖ involved in the suicide attack are
contemplated by it, and next we shall examine how this
classification has influenced the penalty imposed on each
―jobholder.‖ As the offence is one of causing death deliberately,
the classification will have ramifications for deciding whether
the derivative penalty will be life imprisonment or
imprisonment for a term of years.
B. The Principal Perpetrator
Who is considered to be the principal perpetrator in a
suicide attack? As will be explained below, the Military Court
of Appeal applied this legal category, which is the subject of
Section 14(a)(1) of the Order Relating to Liability for an
Offence, exclusively to the suicide terrorist himself. This was
held in the judgment in Ha’nini.67 This case concerned one of
the first suicide attacks in Israel, carried out in the Mechola
junction in the Jordan Valley in 1993, in which the suicide
terrorist detonated a car that he was driving, which was laden
with explosives. As a result of the attack, one person was
killed and many others were injured. The defendant was a
Hamas operative who was involved in planning the attack and,
in particular, preparing the explosive vehicle after he had
received instructions to generate a suicide attack. When
considering the classification of the accused‘s liability for the
purpose of Section 14(a), the Military Court of Appeal held that
the defendant could not be deemed to be a principal perpetrator
as he was not the one who had carried out the direct act
leading to the death of the victim, that is, he was not the one
who had detonated the lethal explosives. In other words, it was
held that the principal perpetrator of the suicide attack was
exclusively the person who had detonated the explosives (and
with reference to a ―no-escape attack,‖ which it will be recalled
was also defined as a suicide attack, exclusively the one who
carried out the fatal shooting). The significance of this was
that only the suicide terrorist could be the principal
67. Appeals (JS) 64+66/02 Military Prosecutor v. Ha'nini and Counter
Appeal, [2004] Judgments of Adm.Terr. 14(1) 136.
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perpetrator of the suicide attack. An identical ruling whereby
only the suicide terrorist could be the principal perpetrator was
delivered in the case of Abu Saris.68
A different broader approach regarding the definition of
the principal perpetrator of a suicide attack was pursued in
Shachshir.69 This was a judgment given by the court of first
instance, prior to the Ha’nini ruling, which became final in the
absence of an appeal against it. The case concerned a person
involved in a suicide attack in the Halisa neighborhood of Haifa
in 2001, where fifteen people were murdered and numerous
others were injured. The defendant had participated in the
attack by agreeing to the suicide terrorist‘s request for
assistance and arranging for a meeting between him and an
operative of the military branch of Hamas. Afterwards, that
operative, together with others, prepared and dispatched the
suicide terrorist to carry out the attack.
The court classified the defendant as a principal
perpetrator on the ground that a principal perpetrator, within
the meaning of Section 14(a)(1), is anyone who performs the
elements of the offence. When the offence is causing death
deliberately, the elements of the offence are deliberately
causing the death of another. Upon the existence of a causal
connection between the acts of the accused and the lethal
outcome, accompanied by the mental element of intent, there is
a deliberate causation of the death of another, a situation
which places the accused in the category of a principal
perpetrator. Put differently, this decision includes within the
category of a principal perpetrator of a suicide attack that has
succeeded, not only the suicide terrorist who embodies the
closest link to the lethal outcome of the attack, but also all the
links who preceded him in the chain of causal connection (i.e.,
those who made an indispensable contribution to the
commission of the offence and foresaw, or should have foreseen,
the occurrence of the lethal outcome)—provided only that they
had the accompanying mental element of intent to cause the
68. Appeals (JS) 2003/05 Abu Saris v. Military Prosecutor, [2006]
(unpublished) (finding that the defendant had no primary liability as part of
the inner circle, but that he was criminally liable as an accessory to the
crime).
69. Ct. (JS) 6184/03 Military Prosecutor v. Shachshir, [2003]
(unpublished).
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death of others. As noted, the Ha’nini ruling was later handed
down, applying the category of principal perpetrator solely to
the suicide terrorist. As we shall see below, in later case law,
defendants who under the Shachshir ruling would have been
deemed to be principal perpetrators, because of the existence of
a causal connection between their acts and the resulting lethal
attack, were placed in other categories.
In view of the unique characteristics of a suicide attack,
the significance of the Ha’nini ruling is that the principal
perpetrator of the offence will not be tried, if indeed he died
during the course of the attack. It should be noted that, in fact,
there have been situations where a ―no-escape attack,‖ which it
will be recalled has been held by the case law to be a suicide
attack, has ended with the potential suicide terrorist
succeeding in killing others but remaining alive; however, so
far, no terrorist who intended to commit suicide but remained
alive has been placed on trial—either because the terrorist was
not caught or was subsequently killed. In these circumstances,
the judicial delineation of the category of principal perpetrator
in relation to suicide attacks is, in effect, purely negative, as its
implementation in relation to defendants is limited to
excluding them from this category, in the absence of any
practical possibility of including any defendant within the
category.
C. The Accomplice
As explained, the Ha’nini ruling confined the category of
―principal perpetrator‖ exclusively to the suicide terrorist. As a
result, the categories relevant to the other participants in the
preparation and execution of the suicide attack are: ―the
accomplice,‖ ―the accessory,‖ and, where someone instigates the
attack but does not take part in its preparation or execution,
―the instigator.‖ Drawing a distinction between the categories
of ―accomplice‖ and ―accessory‖ is not straightforward, and,
consequently, there has been considerable discussion in the
case law in this regard.
In Ha’nini, the Military Court of Appeal dealt for the first
time with the classification of an ―accomplice‖ to the
commission of a suicide attack that succeeded. The court held
that the behavioral element underlying the liability of an
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accomplice to the offence of causing death deliberately is
expressed by performing an act or making an omission, which
is directed at enabling the principal perpetrator (the suicide
terrorist) to commit the offence or assisting him to do so, inter
alia, by providing tools or means to carry out the offence. It
has been held that the mental element required is intention to
cause death with the concomitant intention that the offence of
causing death (and not any offence) will be carried out by the
principal perpetrator (the suicide terrorist). Likewise, it has
been held that it is not necessary for the accomplice to be
aware of the details of the offence, rather it is sufficient that he
is simply aware of its nature.
It will be recalled that this case involved a defendant who
was involved in a suicide attack primarily by preparing the
lethal explosives vehicle in fulfillment of instructions that he
had received to bring about a suicide attack. The court held
that the accused was an ―accomplice‖ based on the elements of
liability discussed above. Later, the court considered the issue
of the sentence to be imposed on the defendant. In this regard,
the court held that as the defendant belonged to the inner
circle of accomplices to the commission of the lethal suicide
attack, in contrast to junior accomplices, he had to be treated in
the same way as those liable for murder, and, accordingly, he
was sentenced to a penalty of life imprisonment.
In other words, in Ha’nini, classifying the defendant as an
―accomplice‖ did not lead to a punitive result that was any
different from what would have been achieved by classifying
him as a ―principal perpetrator.‖ The outcome was different in
A’amouri.70 That case concerned a defendant who was involved
in a suicide attack carried out by means of a car bomb in the
Megiddo junction in 2002. In this attack, seventeen people
were murdered and many others were injured. The defendant
had assisted his friends in Islamic Jihad to transport the
devices needed to create the explosives in a bomb lab,
purchased the car used for the suicide attack as well as its
yellow registration plates, helped carry the containers of
explosives from the bomb lab to the car, and even drove the car
after it had been loaded with explosives.

70. Appeals (JS) 101/03 A'amouri v. Military Prosecutor, [2004]
(unpublished).
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The Military Court of Appeal reiterated the principles of
the Ha’nini ruling regarding the behavioral and mental
elements required to find an ―accomplice‖ liable for an offence
and even noted that the principal liability of an ―accomplice‖
stems from his willingness to assist in the commission of the
offence, independent of whether the assistance is central or
marginal and whether or not it would have been possible to
commit the offence even without this assistance. Against the
background of these principles, it was held that as the accused
was well aware of the fact that the car and the explosive
containers loaded on it were intended for use in a suicide
attack, there was no doubt that he intended not only to cause
the deaths of others, but also intended that his acts would
assist in the commission of the specific offence that was
actually carried out, i.e., the suicide attack in the territory of
Israel (even though he did not know its specific details). He
was, therefore, an ―accomplice‖ to the attack and its lethal
outcome.
When the court came to sentence the defendant, it noted
that there was one accomplice whose liability was very near in
gravity to that of the principal perpetrator, and, accordingly,
the penalty of the two would be identical. There was another
accomplice whose liability was far removed in severity from
that of the principal perpetrator, and, consequently, there was
room to distinguish between their respective sentences. In
applying these principles the court stated that the latter
defendant did not belong to the inner circle of the offence and it
was unclear to what extent he regarded the offence as ―his
offence.‖ His liability was, therefore, less severe, albeit only by
a small measure, compared to the liability of a full accomplice,
who was also involved in the preparatory stages of the offence
and was aware of the details of its commission. Accordingly,
the court saw fit to impose on the accused a sentence of
seventeen terms of life imprisonment (for his part in the
attack); however, it ordered that they be run concurrently, and
thereby negated a difference in principle (albeit not one in
practice) between the penalty appropriate for that accused and
the penalty appropriate (theoretically) for the direct
perpetrator of the attack.
Clearly, the different punitive outcomes of the two
judgments did not stem from a fundamental shift in the nature
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of the ruling, either in relation to the classification of liability
or in relation to the appropriate penalty, but rather from the
application of the ruling to the particular facts of the case.
Both cases dealt with persons who were deemed, under the
same tests, to be accomplices to the suicide attacks. In Ha’nini,
the accused was held to be a full accomplice to the attack and
was therefore sentenced to the penalty fitting the principal
perpetrator of the attack (had he stood on trial). In contrast,
A’amouri dealt with an accused who was not deemed to be a
full accomplice, and he was, therefore, sentenced to a penalty
that was different in principle. It was held that the distinction
between the two types of accomplices would depend on the
extent of the accused‘s affiliation with the inner circle of the
offence and the question of whether or not he saw the offence
as his own.
In the judgment in the Jundiyah case,71 the Military Court
of Appeal referred to a different ―functionary‖ in the
preparation of the suicide attack. The accused was involved in
a suicide attack in the Kiryat Menachem neighborhood in
Jerusalem during 2002 in which eleven people were murdered
and numerous others were injured. The accused participated
by establishing contact between the suicide terrorist and the
dispatcher (at the time of making contact between the two, the
accused was also brought up to date on the preparations for the
attack). In particular, the accused fitted the suicide terrorist
with an explosives belt, which the latter subsequently used to
carry out the lethal attack. In these circumstances, using the
tests applied in Ha’nini and A’amouri, it was held that the
accused was an accomplice to the crime and belonged to the
inner circle of accomplices. Accordingly, he was sentenced to
eleven cumulative terms of life imprisonment for his part in the
offences relating to this attack.
A de facto, albeit not de jure, shift in the definition of the
term ―accomplice‖ took place in the case of Abu Saris.72 In Abu

71. Appeals (JS) 2194/05 Jundiyah v. Military Prosecutor, [2005]
(unpublished).
72. Appeals (JS) 2003/05 Abu Saris v. Military Prosecutor, [2006]
(unpublished). This case involved a defendant who had been involved in a
suicide attack that ended with the death of the suicide terrorist but did not
lead to the deaths of others (and therefore we shall consider it further within
the context of the discussion regarding suicide attacks that failed).
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Saris, the Military Court of Appeal made a very important
statement of principle that is relevant to the issue under
consideration here. In that judgment, the court held that an
accused who did not regard the suicide attack as ―his offence,‖
and, therefore, did not belong to the inner circle of the
offenders who actually executed the attack, would not be
deemed to be an ―accomplice‖ to the offence. In effect, Abu
Saris narrowed—albeit not in a declarative fashion—the
definition of an accomplice to an offence. Now, a defendant
who did not belong to the inner circle because he did not see
the offence as his own would no longer be deemed an
accomplice. This is different from the result the court reached
in A’amouri, in which it drew a distinction between full
accomplices and junior accomplices. Under Abu Saris, it
appears as if the A’amouri distinction is no longer relevant.
Instead, it seems like an accused must meet the following
requirements before he will be considered an accomplice to a
suicide attack:
A. The accused assisted in the commission of the
suicide attack, even if the assistance was
marginal and/or assistance without which the
attack could still have been carried out;
B. The accused intended to cause the deaths of
others, and also intended that his acts would
assist in the commission of the suicide attack,
even if he did not know the precise details of
the attack; and
C. The accused regarded the suicide attack as
his own offence and belonged to the inner
circle of offenders.
As a punitive consequence of this ruling, an accomplice to a
suicide attack will, in principal, only be subject to the penalties
imposed in Ha’nini and Jundiyah—cumulative sentences of life
imprisonment equal to the number of people murdered in the
attack. The penalty imposed in A’amouri will no longer apply
to accomplices because an A’amouri-type defendant will no
longer be classified as an accomplice.
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D. The Accessory
As noted, when a successful suicide attack has taken place,
the classification of ―principal perpetrator‖ will be assigned to
the suicide terrorist alone. Accordingly, when reference is to
another ―jobholder‖ in the preparation or commission of a
suicide attack, the other relevant classifications are
―accomplice‖ and ―accessory.‖ An accused who is not deemed to
be an ―accomplice‖ will almost certainly be regarded as an
―accessory,‖ provided, of course, that he meets the threshold
requirements of the latter category. Clearly, these threshold
requirements are broader than the threshold requirements of
the category of ―accomplice,‖ as being an ―accessory‖ involves
liability of a lesser degree.
In the judgment in the Moukadi case,73 the Military Court
of Appeal was required, for the first time, to consider the
liability of an ―accessory‖ in relation to a successful suicide
attack. That case concerned an accused who was involved in a
suicide attack carried out in 1994 on a No. 5 bus on Dizengoff
Street in Tel Aviv. Twenty-two people were murdered and
many others were injured. According to the factual findings of
the Military Court of Appeal, the defendant‘s role included
transporting the explosives used in preparing the lethal bomb,
purchasing the bag in which the suicide terrorist carried the
bomb, providing sleeping quarters for the terrorist on the night
prior to the attack, transporting the terrorist on the day of the
attack to the bus stop where he caught the bus taking him to
Tel Aviv, and also delivering a tape recording to the news
agency following the attack. It was further held that the
accused knew that the suicide attacker intended to carry out a
suicide attack in Tel Aviv using the explosives that he carried
in his bag (albeit this knowledge did not attach to all the
components of the planned attack). In addition, it was held
that the accused intended, through the provision of his help, to
bring about the lethal outcome that actually occurred.
When referring to the classification of the defendant‘s
liability, the Military Court of Appeal held that his liability
73. Appeals (JS) 65/02 Moukadi
Judgments of Adm.Terr. 14(1) 159.
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was that of an accessory. The court did not directly explain
this finding; however, a perusal of other parts of the judgment
clarifies, to a certain extent, the reasons for the court‘s
conclusion and perhaps even establishes a delimitation of the
category of ―accessory‖ according to the judgment. As part of
the discussion regarding the penalty to be imposed on the
defendant, the court held that not all accessories would be
dealt with in an identical manner, as there were some
accessories who were proximate in terms of gravity to the
principal perpetrator and there were some who were far
removed from him. Under the facts of the case, a clear
hierarchy of penalties had to be created between the accused
and the principal perpetrators. This was necessary in order for
a distinction to be made between him and those who procured,
labored, and toiled to actually execute the offence because the
accused was not involved in the details of the plan and did not
participate in its preliminary planning. Concurrently, in the
discussion of the mental element of the accused, it was held
that it was insufficient to prove that he knew of the suicide
terrorist‘s intention to carry out an attack in Tel Aviv and
actually helped him. Instead, to obtain a conviction, the court
had to be persuaded that the defendant also intended to cause
the lethal outcome through the assistance he provided (and
this indeed was proved in the case of this defendant). From
these statements in the judgment, it is clear that the basic
conditions for falling into the category of ―accessory‖ are the
behavioral element of assistance in actually bringing about the
suicide attack, the mental element of intent to cause the deaths
of others, and the intent that, by his acts, the defendant would
assist in the commission of the suicide attack, even if the
defendant did not know the precise details of the attack.
The judgment does not establish an unequivocal rule for
determining the liability of an accessory who belongs to the
inner circle versus an accessory who does not. In other words,
it is clear that the accused, who had satisfied the first two
elements mentioned above, but did not belong to the inner
circle of offenders, was an ―accessory,‖ albeit an accessory
whose position was not proximate to that of the principal
perpetrator. Nonetheless, no unequivocal ruling was made
regarding an accused who satisfied the first two elements and
also belonged to the inner circle—was he an accessory whose

29

2010]

THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE

749

position was proximate to that of the principal perpetrator?
And if not—what type of accessory could be said to be in a
proximate position to the principal perpetrator?
In effect, the first question was answered at a later stage
in the above mentioned Abu Saris case, by virtue of the ruling
that the accused was an ―accomplice.‖ Against this background
it would appear that today the only distinction between an
―accessory‖ and an ―accomplice‖ relates to whether or not the
accused belongs to the inner circle, where the degree of
proximity to the principal perpetrator will be a function of the
intensity of the assistance. It should be noted that in the
judgment in the Moukadi case, not only was there a reference
for the first time to the category of ―accessory,‖ but there was
also a reference for the first time to the distinction between the
various categories of Section 14(a) of the Order Regarding
Rules of Liability for an Offence, a distinction which, it will be
recalled, has merely punitive ramifications, if any. In other
words, this judgment preceded the rulings in Ha’nini and
A’amouri and certainly the judgment in the matter of Abu
Saris mentioned above, which delineated the category of
―accomplice‖ relative to the category of ―accessory.‖ The
judgment, in effect, dealt with the distinction, even if only in
relation to the particular defendant whose case was being
considered, between an ―accessory‖ and a ―principal
perpetrator,‖ but not between an ―accessory‖ and an
―accomplice.‖ It should also be noted that it even follows from
the judgment that those who procured, labored, and toiled in
order to bring about the suicide attack were in the nature of
principal perpetrators, contrary to the approach that confined
the category of ―principal perpetrators‖ to the suicide attacker
himself who played a later role.
As a result of the ruling that the position of the accused in
the Moukadi case was not proximate to that of the principal
perpetrator, the sentence imposed on that accused was not
derived from the sentence fitting a principal perpetrator,
namely, a life sentence for each of the persons murdered in the
suicide attack. Instead, the defendant was sentenced to a
single term of life imprisonment. As we shall see below, in a
series of later judgments relating to defendants who were
found to be accessories to suicide attacks (but whose positions
did not rise to that of a principal perpetrator), the Military
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Court of Appeal took a further significant step along the same
course, by creating a real and not merely semantic distinction
between the penalty imposed on these accessories to suicide
attacks and the penalty appropriate for the principal
perpetrators of these attacks, by imposing on the former a predetermined term of imprisonment. We shall now turn to a
review of the positions of these accessories, classified according
to the mode of assistance given.
1. The Transporter
Initially, we shall consider an accessory who transports the
suicide terrorist. A number of acts of assistance may be
considered in this connection, starting with the provision of
escort and transport services from the point of departure,
throughout the route and up to the scene of attack, and ending
with the provision of aid to the suicide terrorist on a short
segment of the route only. In the Jaradath case,74 the accused
transferred information to a person escorting the two terrorists
regarding a way of entering the territory of the State of Israel
in such a manner as to point to the particular route. That
same day the two terrorists carried out a ―no-escape‖ suicide
attack in Afula, in which two people were murdered. The
Military Court of Appeal saw fit to impose a determinate
sentence of twenty-five years actual imprisonment on the
defendant, rather than a sentence of life imprisonment. The
main ground for this ruling was that the accessory‘s part in the
attack was limited in that he only pointed to a possible way of
entering the territory of the State of Israel.
On the face of it, the judgment can be explained in terms of
the special situation under consideration there. Generally, the
person responsible for transporting the suicide terrorist during
most of the, or the entire, route to the site of the attack will
belong to the inner circle, so he will not be deemed an
―accessory,‖ but rather an ―accomplice,‖ and will therefore be
sentenced to a penalty that consists of an indeterminate term
of years.75 In the Jaradath case the accused was not a member
74. Appeals (JS) 1886/05 Jaradath v. Military Prosecutor, [2005]
(unpublished).
75. See, e.g., Appeals (JS) 4/04 Abu Abid v. Military Prosecutor, [2004]
(unpublished); Appeals (JS) 1322/05 Auis v. Military Prosecutor, [2006]
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of the inner circle, and therefore, he was described as an
―accessory.‖ Moreover, the assistance that he provided was
momentary and for only a very specific, albeit important,
segment of the journey. It appears that had the accused
provided an ―external service‖ to the members of the internal
circle by way of transporting the suicide terrorist over all or
most of the journey, i.e., had he been an ―accessory‖ (but one
providing assistance of great significance), he would not have
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of years. In any
event, whereas in the Moukadi case, labeling the accused as an
―accessory‖ whose position was not proximate to that of the
principal perpetrator did not lead to the imposition of
imprisonment for a term of years, but only to a semantic
internal distinction within the category of indeterminate
penalties, in the Jaradath case, a fixed term of years in prison
was imposed on a person who was, in effect, an ―accessory‖—
and this is what gives this judgment its importance.
2. The Intermediary
A short time after the Jaradath case, the Military Court of
Appeal considered the Madawi case.76 In Madawi, the court
reached a similar punitive conclusion in relation to another
―jobholder‖ in a suicide attack, namely, the intermediary
between the suicide terrorist and the infrastructure
dispatching him to execute the attack. An ―intermediary‖ is
one who makes the initial contact between someone who is
interested in carrying out a suicide attack and a terrorist
infrastructure that is interested in a suicide terrorist carrying
out a suicide attack. The intermediary‘s services can be
provided upon the suicide terrorist‘s request to locate people
who will help him fulfill his plan, or at the request of
operatives in terrorist organizations who are seeking a suicide
terrorist. In any event, the intermediary performs his task and
with that concludes his role in terms of the attack; only
afterwards will the plan be put into effect.
The Madawi case dealt with an accused who had been
(unpublished). It should be noted that the latter judgment concerned the
same person as had escorted the terrorists in the Jaradath case.
76. Appeals (JS) 2040/05 Madawi v. Military Prosecutor and Counter
Appeal, [2005] (unpublished).
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asked to help commit an attack that was ultimately executed
by the suicide terrorist in Kiryat Yuvel (in which, as
mentioned, eleven people were murdered). Consequently, the
accused approached a member of the infrastructure which
eventually brought about the lethal attack and informed him of
the wishes of the suicide terrorist. The Military Court of
Appeal in effect regarded the accused as an ―accessory‖ and
imposed a sentence of twenty-five years actual imprisonment.
The Military Court of Appeal again reached a similar
conclusion in the Kamamagi case.77 That case dealt with an
accused who was involved in a suicide attack carried out in the
Amakim Mall in Afula, in which three people were murdered
and dozens were injured. The accused‘s part in the attack took
the form of mediating between an operative who was in contact
with the female suicide terrorist on one hand and military
operatives of the Islamic Jihad, who eventually dispatched her
to perform the attack, on the other hand. The court held that
the accused was liable as an ―accessory‖ (also in accordance
with the agreement of the parties), and a sentence of twentyfive years imprisonment was imposed on him.
3. The Cameraman
Fixed terms of imprisonment were also imposed on
―accessories‖ to suicide attacks who had the function of filming
the suicide terrorists. As is well-known, terrorist attacks in
general, and suicide attacks in particular, have a clear
propaganda aspect. Accordingly, prior to many suicide attacks,
the prospective suicide terrorist is filmed with a video camera,
usually while uttering warlike declarations. Following the
attack, this video tape is passed to the news media and is
televised. The position of an accused who took part in such an
abysmal production was first considered by the Military Court
of Appeal in the Sha’ablu case.78
That case concerned an accused who transported two
prospective suicide terrorists on two separate occasions to film

77. Appeals (JS) 2823/05 Kamamagi v. Military Prosecutor, [2006]
(unpublished).
78. Appeals (JS) 1125/04 Sha'ablu v. Military Prosecutor and Counter
Appeal, [2005] (unpublished).
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these types of videos. In both instances, the videos were made
on the evening before the terrorist departed for the planned
suicide attack; both times the filming was carried out in the
presence of the accused. On one occasion, the person being
filmed left to carry out the suicide attack but changed his mind
and returned. In the second case, the person being filmed
reached the entry point into Israel.
Soldiers, however,
suspected him of being a terrorist, fired at him, and, as a
result, the explosives belt worn by him detonated, killing three
civilians and injuring others. It should be noted in relation to
the first incident that at the time of transporting the terrorist
to the place where the film was made, the accused did not know
that his passenger was a potential suicide terrorist, but he did
know that this was a person involved in prohibited activities.
The Military Court of Appeal upheld the finding of the
court of first instance regarding the liability of the accused for
the offences of deliberately causing death and attempting to
deliberately cause death, in accordance with the category of
―accessory,‖ and imposed a sentence of twenty-five years actual
imprisonment. In this case, the assistance was of a low level
compared to the two types of accessories considered previously,
and, therefore, it would appear that had the accused been
convicted exclusively for his involvement in the attack which
succeeded (like the accessories in the above judgments in the
Jaradath case on one hand and the Kamamagi case on the
other), his punishment would have been even lighter than that
actually imposed on him.
The Military Court of Appeal reached a similar result in
the Daruza case.79 In that case, the accused acted together
with the Sha‘ablu in both of the incidents described. On each
occasion he organized the transportation of the potential
suicide terrorist by Sha‘ablu to his (the accused‘s) mother‘s flat,
where the filming took place. In relation to the attack that
succeeded, he even delivered the resulting video tape to the
television stations. This accused was convicted of the same
offences as Sha‘ablu, also as an ―accessory,‖ and he too was
given a sentence of twenty-five years actual imprisonment.
It follows that when an accused is convicted as an

79. Appeals (JS) 1369 + 1375/05 Daruza v. Military Prosecutor and
Counter Appeal, [2005] (unpublished).
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―accessory‖ to a successful suicide attack, and the significance
of the assistance is not such as to make his acts similar to the
acts of the principal perpetrator, the Military Court of Appeal
will deviate from the rule under which it would impose a
sentence of life imprisonment upon the person convicted of the
offence (or offences) of causing death deliberately, and instead
will impose a sentence of a term of years, albeit for a lengthy
period of time. This, in effect, was the only type of case in
which a sentence of life imprisonment was not imposed on an
accused involved in a suicide attack which succeeded.
E. The Instigator
In cases of suicide attacks, it is very difficult to identify a
situation where only ―procurement‖ has taken place. This is
because the ideological background on one hand, and the
complexity of the attack on the other hand, result in most of
the cases involving figures who go far beyond mere
procurement, and the instigator of the attack will generally
perform additional tasks, which will make him liable for the
attack in the capacity of an ―accomplice‖ to the offence. Indeed,
it has often happened that an officer in a terrorist hierarchy
orders his subordinate to commit an attack.
Generally,
however, the person giving the order will quickly become
involved in the concrete planning of the attack or will supply
the means to carry it out—usually in the form of weapons or
money. As such, that person will be considered an ―accomplice‖
to the offence.80
Accordingly, one may ask what punitive considerations
will apply in the case of a mere ―instigator‖ of a suicide attack
that succeeds.81 Conceivably, the instigator may be likened to
80. See, e.g., Samaria Court 7227/02 Military Prosecutor v. Abu el Hijah,
[2005] (unpublished); Samaria Court 6431/03 Military Prosecutor v. Chatab,
[2005] (unpublished); Samaria Court 7449/03 Military Prosecutor v. Ahmed
Basha'rath, [2005] (unpublished). See also CrimA (XX) 2796/95 Anon. v.
Israel, 51 [1997] P.D. 388(3). Cf. the majority opinions in CrFH (XX) 1294/96
Meshulam v. Israel, 52 [1998] P.D. 1(5) and SCrF (TA) 1158/02 Israel v.
Barghouti, [2004] Takdin Mehozi 3430(2) (referring to liability as a ―joint
perpetrator‖ under the Israeli Penal Law).
81. One of the general objectives of punishment is deterrence. See, e.g.,
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91
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an intermediary between the suicide attacker and the
infrastructure, in the sense that both form a link in the
chronology of the attack, but depart from the scene at one of
the initial stages. Conversely, it can be argued that because of
the initiative component, it is appropriate to distinguish the
instigator from the intermediary (who responds to another‘s
initiative—either the suicide terrorist‘s or the infrastructure‘s)
and equate him rather to the accomplices to the offence in the
sense that even though he does not belong to the inner circle,
he is the compass who draws this circle. We should also recall
that in the Moukadi case mentioned above, the accused was
distinguished from those who ―initiated, toiled and labored to
bring about the attack,‖82 and this perhaps allows us to
understand the view of the Military Court of Appeal to the
effect that the instigator resides on the same level of gravity as
the planners of the attack and those who carry it out.83
Immediately prior to the conclusion of this Article, a
judgment was given regarding a rare case where a person at
the top of the hierarchy in a terrorist organization confined
himself ―merely‖ to procuring persons to commit an attack.
Indeed, the suicide attack failed, but it is possible to draw
analogies from the judgment in relation to situations of
procurement regarding a successful suicide attack.
The
judgment was given in the case of Abu Hamdiya.84 That case
concerned a defendant who ordered another to recruit people to
take part in attacks within the framework of the Hamas
organization. When that other person informed the defendant
that a volunteer had been found to commit a suicide attack, the
defendant authorized the plan, instructed the other person to
proceed with the preparations, and asked him to remain in
contact so that the defendant could take responsibility for the
GEO. L.J. 949 (2003). See also Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H.
Robinson, Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for
Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284 (2002).
82. Appeals (JS) 65/02 Moukadi v. Military Prosecutor, [2003]
Judgments of Adm.Terr. 14(1) 159.
83. For a discussion on the liability of the instigator, which is similar to
the liability of the primary perpetrator and perhaps even supersedes it, see
CrimA (XX) 2796/95 Anon. v. Israel, 51 [1997] P.D. 388(3) 404; KEDMI, supra
note 55, at 374.
84. Appeals (JS) 3333/05 Abu Hamdiya v. Military Prosecutor and
Counter Appeal, [2007] (unpublished).
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attack following its execution. Subsequently, the defendant
also received reports regarding the progress of the preparations
but did not involve himself in the planning and preparations.
Ultimately, the prospective suicide terrorist was dispatched to
commit the attack but retracted and returned. The court held
that the accused had committed the offence of attempting to
cause death deliberately as an ―instigator‖ and imposed on him
a sentence of life imprisonment. Clearly, it is possible to draw
conclusions from the penal outcome of this judgment regarding
the sentence that would have been imposed had the offence
been one of procuring a suicide attack that succeeded. In other
words, if a person procuring a suicide attack which failed was
sentenced to life imprisonment, a fortiori, this is the sentence
that would have been imposed had the suicide attack in fact
succeeded. Put differently, it seems clear that, according to the
case law, the position of a person ―procuring‖ a suicide attack
that succeeds is equivalent to the position of an ―accomplice‖ to
this offence.85
IV. Suicide Attacks that Fail
A. Background
As noted, where there is a suicide attack that happily does
85. If a leader of a terrorist organization deliberately distances himself
from involvement in attacks, he then sometimes cannot be convicted as an
―accessory‖ or instigator. See SCrF (TA) 1158/02 Israel v. Barghouti, [2004]
Takdin Mehozi 3430(2) ¶ 172 (explaining that ―it is not possible to convict a
person in Israel of the general offence of aiding an act of murder, and it is
also not possible to convict him of the general offence of procuring an act of
murder. In the same way as the aid must refer to a specific offence with a
concrete goal, so too must the procurement be between one individual and
another, and refer to solicitation to commit a specific offence with a concrete
goal.‖). Still, he may be convicted of the offence of holding a position in a
prohibited organization, in accordance with Regulation 85(1)(b) of the
Emergency Defence Regulations of 1945, which carries a maximum penalty of
ten years imprisonment. See SCrF (TA) 1158/02 Israel v. Barghouti, [2004]
Takdin Mehozi 3430(2) ¶ 139-40, 179 (where the accused was convicted, inter
alia, of activities in a terrorist organization—an offence which carries a term
of imprisonment of up to twenty years); Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance,
5708–1948, sec. 2. Currently, under Israeli law it is possible to convict a
person accused of heading a criminal organization whose activities include
the offences of murder, and impose a sentence of twenty years imprisonment
on him. See Combating Criminal Organizations Law, 5773-2003, sec. 2.
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not result in the death of others, regardless of whether it ends
with the death of the suicide terrorist, the relevant offence is
attempt to cause death deliberately. The general offence of an
attempt to commit an offence is defined in Sections 19 and 20
of the Order Regarding Rules of Liability for an Offence, which
provide as follows:
Section 19 of the Order Regarding Rules of
Liability for an Offence:
Save if otherwise provided or implied in statute,
any law applicable to the commission of the
completed offence shall also apply to an attempt
to commit it.
Section 20 of the Order Regarding Rules of
Liability for an Offence:
A. A person is deemed to attempt to commit an
offence when he begins to put his intention to
commit it into effect by some overt act and by
means adapted to achieve such intention, but
does not achieve such intention to such an
extent as to commit the offence.
B.

It is immaterial, except as regards to
punishment, whether the offender does all
that is necessary on his part to complete the
commission of the offence or whether the
complete commission thereof is prevented by
circumstances independent of his will or
whether he desists of his own motion from
further prosecution of his intention.

C.

It is immaterial that by reason of
circumstances not known to the offender it is
impossible in fact to commit the offence.

D.

A provision which sets out a mandatory
penalty for an offence or a minimum penalty
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for an offence will not apply to an attempt to
commit it.
Delineating the general offence of ―attempt‖ exceeds the
scope of this Article, however, in brief, it should be noted that
there is no substantive difference between this delineation in
the law applied by the military courts in Judea and Samaria
and that prevailing in Israeli law. In contrast, a difference
does exist between the two systems of law in relation to the
maximum penalty. Whereas in Israeli law the maximum
penalty imposed on a person attempting to commit the offence
of murder is twenty years imprisonment,86 according to the law
applied in the military courts, the maximum penalty in the
case of an attempt to cause death deliberately is the same as
the penalty imposed for the completed offence—that is life
imprisonment (theoretically, the death penalty could be
imposed; however, it will be recalled that this is a penalty that
is not imposed in practice).87
It is also important to recall the former language of Section
19 of the Order Regarding Rules of Liability for an Offence,
which provided for the penalty to be imposed in the case of an
attempt to commit an offence. This was language that was in
force until June 2005 and that gave rise to judgments of
principle that are important to cite. This language stated as
follows:
A person who attempts to commit an offence
shall unless some other punishment is provided
by law or security legislation be liable –
(1) to imprisonment for life if the offence which
he tried to commit is one which a person
committing can expect, upon conviction, to be
punished by death;
(2) to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten
years - if the offence which he tried to commit
is one which a person committing can expect
86. See Paras. 25, 27, 34D, 41, 300 and 305 of the Penal Law.
87. See generally Ben Haim, supra note 57.
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to be punished by life imprisonment;
(3) in every other case, to half the maximum
punishment which a person committing the
offence could expect to receive upon being
convicted of the offence.88
In any event, both before and after the amendment, the
courts treated the maximum penalty for the offence of attempt
to cause death deliberately—life imprisonment—as an
exception to the general rule of imposing imprisonment for a
fixed term of years. This was similar to the approach taken
towards every other offence, where only in exceptional
circumstances would the maximum prescribed penalty be
imposed. As we shall see below, in certain cases of liability for
suicide attacks that failed, the maximum penalty of life
imprisonment was in fact imposed. This sentence was imposed
notwithstanding the two aspects that made it exceptional—
first, the very imposition of the maximum penalty, and second,
the very imposition of a life sentence on a person who did not
cause the death of another. As we shall see below, the factors
weighed by the courts when deciding whether to impose a fixed
term of imprisonment or the exceptional penalty of life
imprisonment were more varied than the factors courts
weighed when deciding the same issue for those involved in a
successful suicide attack. Thus, for example, reference was
made not only to the function of the accused in the attack, but
also to other issues, such as the extent to which the accused
performed his part and how close the attack actually came to
fruition.
An additional important aspect of suicide attacks that do
not succeed is that the classification of ―principal perpetrator,‖
which is reserved for the direct perpetrator of the attack,
remains more than merely theoretical, as generally, the
prospective direct perpetrator of the attack remains alive. In
addition it is worth noting the variation that occurs when the
court does not impose the exceptional penalty of life
imprisonment, but rather imposes a sentence of a term of
88. Following the amendment of Section 19, subsection D was inserted
in Section 20 of the Order Regarding Rules of Liability for an Offence.
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years, in contrast to the situation where the suicide attack has
succeeded. Thus, whereas in relation to a suicide attack which
has succeeded, even if the court has imposed a determinate
sentence it will usually be expressed in a lengthy term of about
twenty-five years actual imprisonment; in the case of a suicide
attack that does not succeed, however, a shorter, and
sometimes even significantly shorter, category of determinate
sentences is available.
In the following section of the Article, we shall try and
delineate the categories of penalties that were established by
the case law regarding persons charged with attempting to
cause death deliberately by means of a suicide attack, and
thereby illustrate the punitive considerations guiding the
courts in the difficult task of deciding which sentence to impose
for this offence.
B. Restrictions on Powers of Sentencing
As we can see from the above discussion, when the
maximum penalty for the offence of attempting to cause death
deliberately is equivalent to the maximum penalty for the
completed offence, there is no restriction on the power to
sentence a person convicted of the former offence. However,
the situation was different under the prevailing law prior to
June 2005. Thus, under the former language of Section 19 of
the Order Regarding Rules of Liability for an Offence a court
was entitled to impose the maximum sentence of life
imprisonment on a person attempting to commit an offence,
which had he committed, would have carried with it the death
penalty. In contrast, when the defendant was someone who
had tried to commit an offence that, had he committed it, would
have carried a sentence of life imprisonment, the restrictions
on the power of sentencing confined the ensuing sentence to ten
years imprisonment.
Prima facie, as the maximum penalty for the completed
offence of causing death deliberately is the death penalty, it
follows that the maximum penalty for attempting to cause
death deliberately, including involvement in an attempt to
carry out a suicide attack, is life imprisonment. The courts
have, however, dealt with situations of attempts to carry out
suicide attacks where it has been questioned whether the
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defendant could have expected to be sentenced to the death
penalty had he completed the offence because a negative
answer would result in a restriction on the power to sentence
him for the offence of attempting to cause death deliberately.
This fundamental question arose in the Kaudasi case.89
That case concerned a 15-year-old youth who tried to penetrate
the heart of the State of Israel in order to carry out a suicide
attack with the aid of an explosives belt strapped to his body.
This attack failed as the accused was stopped by soldiers on the
seam line between the sovereign territory of the state and
Judea and Samaria. The accused, who apparently realized
that he had been spotted, attempted to detonate the explosives
and blow himself up in order to injure the soldiers, but failed in
this as well. The Military Court of Appeal examined the
penalty that the accused could theoretically have anticipated
had he committed the completed offence of causing death
deliberately. Section 51 of the Order Regarding Security
Regulations, which it will be recalled is the legislation
providing for this offence, states in the second paragraph that
if, at the time of committing the offence, the accused was less
than 18 years of age, he shall not be sentenced to the death
penalty. Accordingly, the court held that an accused minor
convicted of the offence of attempting to cause death
deliberately could not be deemed to have expected his offence,
had it been completed, to carry the death penalty. Thus, such a
minor was subject to a restricted sentence of ten years
imprisonment. The accused was, therefore, sentenced to only
ten years actual imprisonment for the offence of attempting to
cause death deliberately, even though he was very close to
committing a lethal suicide attack. It should be noted that the
ultimate punishment of the accused was higher, as he was also
convicted of other offences.
The Kaudasi ruling led to numerous other judgments with
similar outcomes. The reason for this is that the phenomenon
of minors being involved in the commission or attempted
commission of suicide attacks, usually as the actual or
potential direct perpetrators, is regrettably and shockingly not
at all unusual. This legal outcome, which all would probably

89. Appeals (JS) 128/02 Kaudasi v. Military Prosecutor 13 Judgments of
Adm.Terr. 164 (2002).
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agree is undesirable, led ultimately to the amendment of
Section 19 of the Order Regarding Rules of Liability for an
Offence, as explained above, and thus the Kaudasi ruling
lapsed.
Prior to the amendment of Section 19, an attempt was
made to expand the Kaudasi ruling in other directions. This
was the case, for example, in Sourakagi,90 which also dealt
with the situation of a suicide terrorist, this time an adult, who
attempted to detonate an explosives belt inside a bus, and who
luckily also failed to accomplish his plan by reason of a
technical malfunction and his subsequent arrest. In that case,
it was argued that the accused could not be treated as someone
who would have been subject to the death penalty had he
committed the completed offence of causing death deliberately
because the panel that had heard the case at first instance was
not empowered to impose the death penalty (because it did not
comprise three officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel).91
Therefore, under the rationale in Kaudasi, as the defendant
had been convicted of an attempt to cause death deliberately,
he should not have been sentenced to a penalty exceeding ten
years imprisonment. The Military Court of Appeal rejected
this argument and held that the issue of the expected penalty
for a completed offence was determined in light of two factors—
the offence and the perpetrator. Incidental and theoretical
factors, such as the composition of the bench that would have
heard the case had it involved a completed offence could not be
taken into account. Accordingly, it was held that, in this case,
there was no restriction on the power to impose sentence and,
in principle, it was possible to impose a sentence of life
imprisonment.
To summarize, the Kaudasi ruling was left confined solely
to the case of a minor committing the offence of attempting to
cause death deliberately. This ruling was valid in relation to
the old language of Section 19 of the Order Regarding the Rules
of Liability for an Offence, but lapsed with the amendment to
the section, so that today there is no restriction on the power to
90. Appeals (JS) 303/03 Sourakagi v. Military Prosecutor, [2004]
(unpublished).
91. Order Regarding Security Regulations (JS) (no. 378) 1970, S.H. §
47(a)(8).
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sentence for the offence of attempting to cause death
deliberately. Having examined the question of the power to
impose punishment for the offence of attempting to cause death
deliberately, we shall now turn to the use made of this power in
relation to the different ―jobholders‖ in a suicide attack which
has failed.
C. The Prospective Suicide Terrorist
First, we shall consider the central figure in every planned
suicide attack—the prospective suicide terrorist. In contrast to
a suicide attack that has succeeded, where this figure is no
longer alive (except in the case of a ―no-escape attack‖ which
has not ended with his death), in a failed suicide attack, this
figure always survives (except in cases of a suicide terrorist
who blows himself up but does not ―succeed‖ in killing others in
the process).
When one examines the case law that deals with these
situations, it becomes apparent that the principal consideration
affecting the penalty imposed on the potential suicide terrorist
is to what extent the accused acted to fulfill his part of the
mission, whereas the degree to which the attack almost
reached fruition is a consideration of only secondary force.
This is, of course, only the case when the court is free of
restrictions on the power of sentencing introduced by the above
Kaudasi ruling. In mathematical terms, it is possible to say
that the sentence is a function of two variables—the variable
which relates to the extent to which the accused has completed
his part and the variable which relates to the proximity of the
attack to fruition. The first variable is of key influence on the
value of the function whereas the second variable possesses
merely secondary influence. Below we shall examine a number
of potential situations, with reference to the above variables,
and we shall consider the penalties ultimately imposed in cases
falling within these categories.
The first type of case we shall consider concerns a
prospective suicide terrorist who does everything possible to
carry out the planned attack, and only a hairsbreadth stands
between him and the success of his mission. The Sourakagi
case is an example of this situation—a suicide terrorist who
tried to blow himself up inside a bus but failed only because of
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a technical malfunction in the explosives and his subsequent
arrest. In that case, after the court rejected the argument that
it was restricted in its power of sentencing, it sentenced the
accused to life imprisonment.
Another type of case involves a prospective suicide
terrorist who does everything he can to execute a planned
attack, but fails because the attack is foiled before the terrorist
reaches the planned site of execution. An example of this is the
Tubasi case.92 The accused in that case was dispatched to
execute a suicide attack in the ―City Hall‖ club in Haifa. The
accused succeeded in entering the territory of the State of
Israel but was arrested near the seam line with the explosives
beside him in his vehicle. Here, too, the accused was sentenced
to life imprisonment. In the Bushkar and Ramadan case,93
however, an apparently contradictory punitive outcome was
produced.
The latter case concerned a potential suicide
terrorist and his transporter who departed to execute a
planned attack in Tel Aviv. The two succeeded in entering the
State of Israel but were arrested near the seam line. Prima
facie, this case was identical to that of Tubasi, although,
ultimately, a sentence of life imprisonment was not imposed—
the defendants received a sentence of twenty years actual
imprisonment. In imposing this sentence, the court explained
that the test of proximity to completing the attack is not
geographical; rather, it refers to the scope of the additional acts
needed in order to implement the planned attack. In that case
the defendants were caught prior to being equipped with
explosive belts, which awaited them in a concealed place close
to the planned site of the attack, and, therefore, the court did
not see fit to impose the maximum penalty on them. Instead,
the court chose to impose a determinate sentence, albeit one
entailing a heavy term of imprisonment.
The next type of case deals with the situation where a
hairsbreadth separates the potential suicide terrorist from the
realization of his plan, but where he has not done everything
possible to implement that plan. An illustration of this is the

92. Appeals (JS) 133/03 Tubasi v. Military Prosecutor, [2004]
(unpublished).
93. Appeals (JS) 311 + 318 + 314 + 317/03 Bushkar and Ramadan v.
Military Prosecutor and Counter Appeal, [2004] (unpublished).
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Shalchati case.94 The suicide attack planned there was in two
parts. One suicide terrorist was supposed to blow himself up
and immediately afterwards, the second terrorist was supposed
to fire an automatic weapon in all directions. The attack was
planned to take place at the central bus station in Tel Aviv.
Ultimately, only the first part of the attack was carried out,
injuring a number of civilians. The accused, who was the
prospective second suicide terrorist, threw away his weapon
and ran from the scene. The court at first instance imposed a
sentence of life imprisonment on the accused, but the Military
Court of Appeal replaced this sentence with a lengthy prison
term of thirty years actual imprisonment. In this way the
court acknowledged, on the one hand, that the attack had led to
injury to others and only as an accident of fate failed to lead to
any deaths, while, on the other hand, also recognized that the
accused, at the last critical moment, chose not to carry out his
part of the attack, thereby preventing a more serious result
from occurring.
Another rare case is where a hairsbreadth separates the
potential suicide terrorist from the realization of his goal, but
where the attack is prevented because he fully retracts. This
occurred in the Tauwalbah case.95 There, the accused, acting
under the malevolent and persistent influence of his older
brother, a senior terrorist in the Islamic Jihad, reached Haifa
in order to execute a suicide attack using an explosives belt
strapped to his body. The accused was at the point of
detonating the explosives belt near a crowd of people on two
occasions, but each time—a moment before he was to pull the
switch—he retracted. Afterwards, the accused also removed
the explosives belt and left it in an abandoned building with
the detonator detached and inoperative. The Military Court of
Appeal regarded the acts of the accused as expressing complete
withdrawal from his plan. Moreover, the court took into
account the fact that the willingness of the accused to proceed
was, from the beginning, only the result of the persistent, illfated pressure exerted by his brother. The court, therefore,
imposed on him a lenient sentence of seven years actual
94. Appeals (JS) 304/03 Shalchati v. Military Prosecutor, [2004]
(unpublished).
95. Appeals (JS) 225/02 Tauwalbah v. Military Prosecutor, [2004]
Judgments of Adm.Terr. 14(1) 319.
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imprisonment. In this case, the court also took the highly
unusual step of rejecting the plea bargain submitted to it
(under which the court was asked to impose a sentence of
eleven years actual imprisonment on the accused) on the
ground that it was excessively harsh.
There is good reason for the huge discrepancy between the
two cases just described. Indeed, both defendants refrained at
the last moment from executing their part of the plan, thereby
not killing themselves or others. However, whereas in the first
case the defendant was involved in an attack that was carried
out in part, and only by a miracle did not end in the deaths of
others but ―only‖ in their injury, in the second case, the attack
did not take place at all. Moreover, in the second case, the
court concluded that there had been complete repentance, a
rare occurrence in relation to someone who had already gone
out to execute a suicide attack, whereas in the first case the
court did not reach a similar conclusion.
The last type of case concerns a suicide terrorist who goes
out to execute an attack, retreats before implementing the
plan, usually because of the presence of the security forces, but
does not abandon his original intention to carry out the attack
and, in effect, fails to make good on this intention because of
his subsequent arrest. This category—failure of the attack as a
result of the arrest of the potential suicide terrorist after he
has postponed the attack for tactical reasons—is an
intermediate case between the extreme situations of failure of
the attack as a result of the full repentance of the potential
suicide terrorist and failure of the attack merely because of the
arrest of the potential suicide terrorist en route to the planned
attack. Accordingly, a standard of punishment of twenty years
actual imprisonment—or even a little more—has been set for
this class of circumstances, placing it in the range between the
levels of punishment in the two extremes described above.
This was the situation in the cases of Sa’id96 and Jauwad
respectively.97 Both cases concerned a suicide terrorist who
had made his way to execute a suicide attack in the Sharon
area, but retraced his footsteps near the seam line because of
96. Appeals (JS) 1650/04 Military Prosecutor v. Sa'id, [2004]
(unpublished).
97. Appeals (JS) 1917/04 Jauwad v. Military Prosecutor, [2004]
(unpublished).
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the presence of the security forces, and, at a certain later stage,
was arrested. In the second case, a sentence was imposed in
accordance with the above standard of punishment with the
court even taking the unusual step of rejecting a plea bargain,
which sought to impose fifteen years actual imprisonment on
the defendant, on the ground that it was overly lenient.
This review of the types of situations that arise points to
the fact that the primary factor weighing on the punitive
outcome relates to the question of the lengths to which the
potential suicide terrorist has gone to fulfill his part in the
scheme, whereas, on occasion, the secondary factor of the
proximity of the attack to fruition also carries weight. In the
case law, implementation of the primary consideration needed
for the full action generally led to a sentence of life
imprisonment, an action which was partial by virtue of full
repentance led to a sentence of seven years actual
imprisonment, and an action which was partial for tactical
reasons led to a sentence of twenty years actual imprisonment
and a little more. So great was the impact of this consideration
that in one case partial implementation of the attack did not
lead to a sentence of life imprisonment, in view of the nonfulfillment on the part of the accused.
The secondary
consideration influenced the penalty in a situation where there
was an absence of the determinative component of the
proximity to fruition because the accused had not yet equipped
himself with the destructive implements. In that case, the
secondary consideration led to a more lenient sentence so that
instead of the sentence of life imprisonment generally imposed
on someone acting to fulfill his part, a sentence of twenty years
actual imprisonment was imposed. Naturally, these penalties
were imposed in cases where the court was not restricted in its
sentencing power, since such restrictions, when applicable,
dictate the punitive outcome.
Having examined the sentencing considerations and the
punitive consequences in relation to the principal ―functionary‖
in a failed suicide attack, namely, the potential suicide
terrorist, the time has come to examine these factors in relation
to other ―functionaries‖ in the suicide attack. Ultimately, the
position of each ―functionary‖ will be compared to that of the
potential suicide terrorist in similar circumstances.
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D. The Dispatcher
The ―jobholder‖ we shall turn to next is the dispatcher of
the suicide terrorist. As we shall see below, the case law has
not confined this category to the person who is the driving force
behind the ―production‖ of the planned attack. The leading
judgment in this matter was produced in the case of Atzam
Jerar.98 That case concerned a defendant who was convicted of,
inter alia, involvement in a suicide attack that failed because
the two potential suicide attackers retraced their steps in the
area of the seam line after encountering the increased presence
of the security forces. The involvement of the defendant in the
attack primarily took the form of helping to prepare the
explosive belts, filming the two suicide terrorists with a video
camera for familiar propaganda purposes, and helping to
transfer the explosive belts to the terrorists, all while he was
aware of the details of the planned attack.
The Military Court of Appeal regarded the accused as a
full accomplice to the offence in view of the fact that he was a
member of the inner circle of the offence, and accordingly, saw
him as one of the dispatchers of the suicide attackers.
Referring to the legal position of the dispatcher, the court held
that events taking place after the potential suicide attacker
had departed for his mission were irrelevant. This was because
by dispatching the suicide terrorist the dispatcher had done
everything possible in order to achieve the lethal outcome,
similar to a person pressing on the trigger of a firearm. The
court further noted that the legal position of a dispatcher
should be even more serious than that of the suicide terrorist
himself for two reasons. First, a person wishing to take his
own life cannot be deterred by the threat of punishment should
he fail, whereas this is not true of his dispatcher who is not
willing to lose his life, and therefore, can be subjected to a
deterrent punishment.
Second, the dispatcher is more
dangerous. Whereas the suicide terrorist performs his mission
and dies, the dispatcher continues to act and seeks to bring
about additional attacks.
In view of these principles, the court imposed a sentence of
98. Appeals (JS) 183 + 190/03 Military Prosecutor v. Atzam Jerar and
Counter Appeal, [2004] (unpublished).
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life imprisonment on this defendant, even though the planned
attack was not carried out and the potential suicide attackers
retreated prior to infiltrating the sovereign territory of the
State of Israel. Moreover, the suicide attackers, including
Jauwad—mentioned above in the category of potential suicide
attackers—were not given a sentence of life imprisonment.99 In
contrast, the Atzam Jerar judgment placed an emphasis on the
accused fulfilling his role completely; therefore, the fact that
the desired lethal outcome did not ensue did not act in his
favor, whereas in relation to the potential suicide attackers,
this fact did act in their favor, as the failure was the result of
their decision, albeit for tactical reasons only. In this way, the
court gave effect to its approach that, on occasion, the
dispatcher‘s sentence will be harsher than that of the potential
suicide terrorist himself. In this connection it is also important
to emphasize that Jauwad was not the ―driving force‖ behind
the attempted attack, but was the ―second fiddle‖ and perhaps
even ―third fiddle‖ in that event. Yet, the Military Court of
Appeal regarded the inner circle of the offence as the
geometrical place for the category of dispatcher of the suicide
attacker, and accordingly held, as a matter of principle, that all
the members of this circle deserved a sentence of life
imprisonment, including the defendant.
Not long afterwards the Military Court of Appeal heard the
case of an additional participant in the same event, Mahmed
Jerar.100 The accused, a family member of the previous
defendant, was involved even more deeply in the attack,
particularly in preparing the explosive belts, giving them to the
terrorists, and explaining to the potential suicide attackers how
the belts should be activated. At the same time, the defendant
was not the ―driving force‖ behind the attack—that was a third
person who planned the attack and on whose instructions all
the other participants acted, both in relation to the preparation
and the attempt to commit the attack. It should also be noted
that this third party was not tried by the court but rather by a
higher force.
Prima facie, in view of the decision in the case of Atzam
99. Appeals (JS) 1917/04 Jauwad v. Military Prosecutor, [2004]
(unpublished).
100. Appeals (JS) 284 + 289/03 Military Prosecutor v. Mahmed Jerar
and Counter Appeal, [2004] (unpublished).
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Jerar, there was certainly no obstacle to imposing a sentence of
life imprisonment on the defendant Mahmed Jerar. In that
case, however, the prosecution did not ask for a sentence of life
imprisonment in the court of first instance, but merely
―suitable punishment‖ (as part of an arrangement between the
parties). It is a well-known rule that only in exceptional cases
will the court impose a sentence on the defendant that is not
asked for by the prosecution, a fortiori when the sentence is
one of life imprisonment, and even more so when the issue is
the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment for an offence
where no one was killed. This was the background for the
conflicting opinions in the judgment. According to the majority
opinion, the decisive factor was the fact that the accused was
the dispatcher of a suicide terrorist and, therefore, according to
the principles established earlier in the Atzam Jerar case, he
had to be sentenced to life imprisonment. According to the
dissenting opinion, the decisive factor was the manner in which
the prosecution had asked for the sentence, and, accordingly,
on this view, the punishment that the accused merited was
that imposed on him by the court of first instance—thirty years
actual imprisonment.
Based on these two judgments, it appears clear that the
Military Court of Appeal applies a firm principle under which a
―dispatcher‖ of a suicide terrorist will always be sentenced to
life imprisonment irrespective of how the suicide terrorist acted
after he was dispatched on his mission. Likewise, a dispatcher
will be defined broadly, i.e., any person belonging to the inner
circle of the offence—that is to say, an accomplice. Accordingly,
it has frequently occurred that the sentence imposed on the
dispatcher, in the broad sense, was life imprisonment, whereas
the potential suicide terrorist was given a determinate
sentence.
As already mentioned, an identical rationale
supports the case law concerning persons confining themselves
to ―procuring‖ a suicide attack, even if the attack fails.101
E. The Transporter
This category consists of defendants whose job is to escort
101. Appeals (JS) 2805 + 3333/05 Abu Hamadiya v. Military Prosecutor
and Counter Appeal, [2007] (unpublished).
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potential suicide terrorists en route to executing attacks.
Sometimes the transporters only escort the terrorist along a
short stretch of the route. When dealing with the category of
the potential suicide terrorist, we considered the case of
Bushkar and Ramadan.102 It will be recalled that that case
concerned a potential suicide terrorist and his escort who were
arrested in the seam line area en route to carry out a suicide
attack using an explosives belt that awaited them near the
scene of the planned attack. The Military Court of Appeal
imposed a sentence of twenty years imprisonment on the two,
and we analyzed the reasons leading to this verdict. The
important point in relation to the transporter is the fact that
the court made no punitive distinction whatsoever between the
transporter and the prospective suicide terrorist. We are not
concerned here with the fact that the punitive outcome was
identical, but rather with the manner in which the court
achieved this result, specifically the court‘s failure to draw any
distinction between the two ―jobholders.‖
Two additional cases also considered the position of people
transporting prospective suicide terrorists, this time ones who
retraced their footsteps—the cases of Ra’ed el Ashkar103 and
Nagi el Ashkar104. These cases concerned the transportation of
a prospective suicide terrorist, Ali Sa‘id, who managed to cross
the seam line into Israel but withdrew in view of the increased
Israeli security presence. He was later caught. His position
was reviewed earlier in relation to the category of prospective
suicide terrorists. With respect to each of the transporters, it
was held as a matter of principle that a distinction had to be
drawn between each of them and Sa‘id, as they had played a
lesser role than he. Accordingly, each of the transporters was
sentenced to a lighter sentence than Sa‘id. Thus, whereas Sa‘id
was sentenced to a term of twenty-one years actual
imprisonment, Nagi el Ashkar was sentenced to eighteen years
imprisonment and Ra‘ed el Ashkar was sentenced to fifteen
years imprisonment. It should be noted that the distinction
102. Appeals (JS) 311 + 318 + 314 + 317/03 Bushkar and Ramadan v.
Military Prosecutor and Counter Appeal, [2004] (unpublished).
103. Appeals (JS) 2688/04 Ra'ed el Ashkar v. Military Prosecutor, [2005]
(unpublished).
104. Appeals (JS) 363/03 Nagi el Ashkar v. Military Prosecutor, [2004]
(unpublished).
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between the two transporters stemmed from factual differences
in the involvement of each in the transportation of Sa‘id.
A comparison of these judgments shows that whereas in
the Ramadan and Bushkar case, no distinction, whether
fundamental or punitive, had been drawn between the
prospective suicide terrorist and his transporter, in the Ra’ed el
Ashkar case, the transporters were distinguished as a matter of
principle in their favor compared to the prospective suicide
terrorist. Accordingly, each was given a more lenient sentence,
reduced by a number of years compared to the prospective
suicide terrorist, and a distinction was even drawn between the
transporters inter se, in accordance with each one‘s role in the
transportation process.
In any event, when dealing with a transporter, it is clear
that what happens to the prospective suicide terrorist is
relevant in the same way that it is relevant to determining the
appropriate sentence for the prospective suicide terrorist
himself. In contrast, what happens to the prospective suicide
terrorist is irrelevant when it comes to sentencing dispatchers.
The same outcome was achieved in the Hama’amra case.105
That case concerned a defendant who escorted the prospective
suicide terrorist over a long stretch of the route. The terrorist
and a second escort were later killed when the explosives in
their car detonated. The Military Court of Appeal treated the
defendant as an accomplice to the offence, but not as one
reaching the level of dispatcher, and, accordingly, he was not
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment as he would have been
had he been deemed a dispatcher. Instead he was sentenced to
a term of thirty years actual imprisonment, undoubtedly a
heavy sentence, but still substantively and fundamentally
different from life imprisonment. Consequently, even though
this escort was held to be an accomplice to the offence, the
principal consideration in terms of the punishment was still
the fate of the suicide terrorist (who certainly was closer to
completing his part in the attack than those who retreated
tactically as described above), and, accordingly, he was given a
longer sentence than escorts of those who withdrew tactically.
These issues have added importance when we return to a

105. Appeals (JS) 2377/04 Military Prosecutor v. Hama'amra, [2005]
(unpublished).
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consideration of the Atzam Jerar ruling, which, it will be
recalled, was the guiding ruling in relation to dispatchers.
There it was held that the accomplice to the attempt to execute
a lethal suicide attack was similar to a dispatcher who was
subject to a sentence of life imprisonment. In the Hama’amra
case, the escort was held to be an accomplice; nonetheless, the
court did not deem him to be a dispatcher. It is not clear
whether by this the court intended to restrict the definition of
dispatcher in the Atzam Jerar ruling; however, it is clear that,
from the point of view of the court, a sharp line has to be drawn
between the ―transporter‖ and the ―dispatcher,‖ in terms of
both punitive considerations and punitive outcomes.
F.

The Intermediary

As will be recalled, this category consists of persons who,
even prior to the commencement of the planning of the attack,
mediate between the prospective suicide terrorist and the
infrastructure that sends that terrorist on his mission, either
by way of identifying the infrastructure for the suicide terrorist
or by way of identifying a suicide terrorist for the
infrastructure.
The issue of sentencing ―intermediaries‖ arose in the Abu
Aiesha case.106 That case concerned the attack that was the
subject of the Shalchati case referred to above, which ended
with the death of the suicide terrorist and injuries to a number
of civilians. The accused in that case was the person who
mediated between the infrastructure and the suicide terrorist.
The court of first instance was asked as part of a plea bargain
to sentence the accused to a term of eighteen years actual
imprisonment. The court, however, rejected this plea bargain
and imposed a sentence of twenty-five years actual
imprisonment. The Military Court of Appeal reduced the
sentence to make it consistent with the plea bargain and stated
that while the plea bargain was lenient, it was not so extreme
as to justify its rejection. The main reason for this was the
nature of the sentence imposed on Shalchati, namely, thirty
years actual imprisonment. It will be recalled that Shalchati‘s
106. Appeals (JS) 38/04 Abu Aiesha v. Military Prosecutor, [2004]
(unpublished).
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function was to shoot passers-by following the explosion, but
instead he ran away from the scene of the attack and thereby
prevented a more serious death toll.
It is clear from the judgment that the intermediary is not
subject to the same punitive considerations as those applicable
to the dispatcher, in view of the fact that he is not sentenced to
life imprisonment. A more meticulous reading of the judgment
shows, however, that the court apparently also regards the
position of the intermediary as less serious than that of the
prospective suicide terrorist. This is because there is a
significant discrepancy in the punishment imposed on the
intermediary and the punishment imposed on Shalchati, who
planned to lose his life during the execution of the attack, even
though Shalchati was credited with the fact that he did not
complete his part of the attack. Thus, the judgment relied on
the premise that a more lenient sentence had to be imposed on
the accused, Abu Aiesha, compared to Shalchati. It should be
noted that even if we regard the appropriate punishment for an
intermediary to be slightly more severe than that imposed in
this case, this conclusion remains valid.107
An additional relevant judgment was that given in the case
of Abu Saris,108 mentioned previously in a different context.
That case concerned an accused who mediated between a
suicide terrorist and the infrastructure, where the suicide
terrorist blew himself up and as a result three people were
injured. The Military Court of Appeal upheld the sentence of
twenty-two years actual imprisonment that was imposed on
the accused by the lower court even though the court stated
that it was only by miracle that the attack did not result in the
loss of lives and that it could have, if it chose, imposed a more
severe sentence.
The result of this judgment is similar to the one reached in
the Abu Aiesha case, which was even cited in the Abu Saris
judgment.109 Thus, even in the most serious situation possible
107. It will be recalled that the issue was the adoption of a plea bargain
that was stated to be lenient but not excessively so.
108. Appeals (JS) 2003/05 Abu Saris v. Military Prosecutor, [2006]
(unpublished).
109. Indeed, it is interesting that in this quotation it was said that Abu
Aiesha deserved the sentence of twenty-five years actual imprisonment
although it was not imposed in view of the special circumstances of that case,
i.e., the existence of the plea bargain and the sentence imposed on the
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in relation to a suicide attack that failed, where only a
hairsbreadth separated the attack from one which achieved its
goal—the murder of others—the intermediary was still only
sentenced to a term of years—a term of years that was not even
the maximum term available for determinate sentences, unlike
the position applicable to the dispatcher and even the
transporter. If we take a step back we will recall that a
comparable punishment was imposed on intermediaries in
suicide attacks that did succeed in achieving lethal results.
Thus, the position of an ―intermediary‖ is less grave than
that of the ―potential suicide terrorist,‖ so that the fate of the
latter dictates the punitive outcome of the former, subject to
the appropriate punitive differential.
This result is not
accidental as is clear if we recall the rulings of principle made
in the Abu Saris case, which we have already discussed, where
the prospective suicide terrorist was the principal perpetrator
(even if only potentially so) and the intermediary was in the
nature of an ―accessory.‖
V. Conclusion
In recent years the State of Israel has faced the complex
reality of multiple suicide attacks. As a democracy, the state
has chosen the legal process as the appropriate means for
dealing with those participating in these attacks. Among the
legal systems operating in the State, the military courts in
Judea and Samaria were chosen as the legal arena for facing
this challenge. As a result, in recent years, the military courts
have dealt with the positions of numerous defendants who were
involved in suicide attacks that both led and failed to achieve
lethal outcomes. As part of this process, the courts were
required to contend with a variety of issues. In this Article we
have tried to present the principal issues while focusing
primarily on the judgments of the Military Court of Appeal. In
the majority of judgments, if not all, the court recognized the
need to find a balance between two important considerations.
The first consideration is the importance of broadcasting a
clear and unequivocal message to the effect that participating
in this criminal phenomenon, which is so extraordinary in its
accomplice Shalchati.
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seriousness (particularly because of the atmosphere of terror it
has instilled in the citizens of Israel since the establishment of
the State of Israel and even from an earlier date), will lead to
extraordinarily severe punishment. The second consideration
is the need to ensure compatibility between the circumstances
of each specific attack and the punishment imposed.
Accordingly, a policy of severe punishment has developed
for those involved in suicide attacks, compared to those
involved in other types of attacks. Concurrently, this policy
has created a hierarchy between the different types of
participants in the suicide attacks that depends primarily on
the role played in the attack and less on whether the attack
has led to a lethal outcome or how close it has come to being
lethal. Suicide attacks have been defined broadly to include
―no-escape attacks.‖ This outcome is desirable from the point
of view of the goal of deterrence. In various contexts, the
courts impose harsher sentences for particular offences in order
to increase the deterrent effect.110 From the point of view of
this objective, it is important not only to impose harsher
punishments, but also to create certainty that it will be
imposed. Therefore, a final outcome that consists of severe
punishments that are uniform and stable is desirable from the
point of view of the goal of deterrence.111
Where the suicide attacks have led to a lethal outcome,
this hierarchy is sometimes confined to the conceptual arena,
in which distinctions are drawn between consecutive life
sentences and concurrent life sentences or a single life
sentence. When the case involves accessories, however, the
hierarchy sometimes leads to substantive and practical
distinctions, so that these defendants are made subject
exceptionally to a determinate sentence, albeit for a very
lengthy period. It should be noted that in this context no
difference can be seen in the case law between the sentencing
of participants in lethal suicide attacks and the sentencing of
participants in ―other types‖ of murderous attacks.
When the courts are concerned with suicide attacks which
110. See JAKOB BAZAK, PUNISHMENT PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION IN
ISRAEL AND IN JEWISH LAW 81 (1998) (Heb).
111. Silvia M. Mendes, Certainty, Severity, and their Relative Deterrent
Effects: Questioning the Implications of the Role of Risk in Criminal
Deterrence Policy, 32 POL‘Y STUD. J. 59 (2004).
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have not led to a lethal outcome, a more severe approach has
been taken than with respect to ―other types‖ of attacks which
have not led to a lethal outcome, to the extent that the court
has imposed sentences of life imprisonment—the maximum
and exceptional sentence for the offence of attempting to cause
death deliberately. Naturally, here too a hierarchy has been
created; however, bearing in mind the character of the offence
and its circumstances, the range of sentences imposed within
the framework of the hierarchy has been considerably broader
than in relation to suicide attacks that have succeeded, to the
point where the court has even imposed a determinate sentence
of merely a few years imprisonment in exceptional cases of a
more minor nature.
Yet, placing the chief emphasis on the role played by
participants in the attack has also led to a certain anomaly,
from the point of view of the aspiration to achieve, or at least
achieve in so far as possible, an outcome whereby the person
dispatching the suicide terrorist is subject to a punishment of
life imprisonment even if the suicide terrorist fails in his
mission to bring about the deaths of others or is even not close
to achieving this goal. Indeed, on occasion, persons assisting a
suicide attack that has led to the deaths of others are subject to
a lesser punishment, both in practice and in quality—namely,
imprisonment for a term of years.
In any event, it is clear that the military court system in
Judea and Samaria has considerable experience in dealing
judicially with the monstrous phenomenon of suicide attacks.
This experience may well be useful in the State of Israel and
abroad, when legal systems are required to contend with this
aberrant situation using the tools of a cultured nation.
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